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I. INTRODUCTION 
Once upon a time there was a family-run business, which sold 
appliances.1  One of the family members, a minority owner in the 
business, managed the company.  He was at times quite belligerent.  
Over time, his idea of where the family business was heading 
increasingly conflicted with the ideas of the other owners.  The 
minority owner became an ineffective manager and started causing 
the family business to lose money.  Eventually the family voted to 
remove him from his position as manager.  Feeling slighted, he 
filed suit against the family members for oppression. 
Because the minority owner was a lawyer, he was able to file 
multiple suits to “expedite justice.”  Among these suits were claims 
against the lawyers representing the family members/co-owners 
who had voted the minority owner out of the business.  During one 
proceeding, the minority owner prevailed against the lawyers when 
the court found adequate evidence to allege an aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the lawyers.  But the minority 
owner lost on remand.  The lawsuits against the lawyers and the 
family members kept coming. 
In the ten years following the initial lawsuit, the minority 
owner sued most of the lawyers and the judges who had any 
affiliation with his cases.  He claimed that everyone, including the 
judges who presided over his case (if he lost), was conspiring 
against him.  The state appeals court finally barred the minority 
owner from asserting more claims against anyone related to the 
 1. This anecdote is based on the Kurker v. Hill series of cases.  Kurker v. Hill, 
689 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that minority owner’s allegations 
against co-owners and lawyers supported claims of oppression and civil 
conspiracy). 
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subject matter.2  Unfortunately, his actions took a toll on a number 
of different parties, including the lawyers. 
This story is an example, albeit extreme, of what may happen if 
a minority owner in a closely-held business cries foul and alleges 
oppression.  The story serves to illustrate the dangers that confront 
lawyers who represent majority owners, specifically the danger of a 
minority owner suing a majority owner’s lawyer for aiding and 
abetting oppression. 
This paper addresses a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting 
her client’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to a co-owner.  It first 
gives a general overview of civil aiding and abetting law and focuses 
primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b).3  
The next section of this paper delves further into aiding and 
abetting in the context of fiduciary duties and distinguishes 
between the duties owed in various contexts, including the inter-se 
duties existent in closely-held businesses.4  That section is also 
devoted to discussing a lawyer’s role in a client’s breach of fiduciary 
duty and presents the difficulty in determining whether a lawyer 
aided and abetted her client’s oppressive conduct in a closely-held 
business.5  Finally, it confronts the need to create a rule that 
imposes liability onto lawyers who knowingly assist oppressive 
conduct but is not so over-inclusive that it holds lawyers responsible 
when they are unaware of their clients’ oppressive conduct.6 This 
paper concludes that there must be some procedural safeguards, 
such as an expert witness, to prevent innocent lawyers from being 
held liable for their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty.7 
 2. Kurker v. Kassler, No. 03-P-15, 2004 WL 556959, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Mar. 22, 2004).  The judge remarked: 
At some point, Mr. Kurker evidently concluded that his litigation 
misfortunes were the product of an ever-widening conspiracy between 
the other parties to the case, their attorneys, and each judge in the 
Massachusetts trial and appellate courts who had touched the case in any 
way. . . . Mr. Kurker’s allegations cross[ed] the line that separates the 
merely frivolous from the preposterous. 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. See infra Part II; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. See infra Part III.B. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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II. AIDING AND ABETTING IN GENERAL 
The tort of aiding and abetting developed out of the common 
law doctrine of concerted action.8  Under this doctrine, a person 
who acts in concert with others is liable for the unlawful acts of the 
group, as well as the unlawful acts of the individual members of the 
group.9  In the United States, the practice of holding persons 
acting in concert jointly and severally liable for all wrongs arising 
out of the group originated in the criminal justice system.10  Courts 
gradually began holding persons who acted in concert in the 
commission of torts jointly and severally liable for damages that the 
third party incurred.11  The doctrine of concerted action is now 
prevalent in civil actions and encompasses both conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting.12 
 8. See Pittman ex rel. Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a), (b) (1979), which states 
that aiding and abetting liability is a variety of concerted-action liability); see also 
Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 40, 142 N.W. 930, 939 (1913) 
(applying the “well recognized” rule “that all who actively participate in any 
manner in the commission of a tort, or who procure, command, direct, advise, 
encourage, aid, or abet its commission, or who ratify it after it is done, are jointly 
and severally liable therefor[e].”). 
 9. See Herman v. Wesgate, 464 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) 
(holding that passengers attending stag party were jointly and severally liable for 
injuries the plaintiff sustained from being thrown off boat, even though not all 
passengers directly assisted). 
 10. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618–19 (1949) 
(acknowledging that where “[o]ne who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 
or procures the commission of an act is as responsible for that act as if he 
committed it directly” is a theory firmly “engrained in the law.”); see also Pinkerton 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946) (stating that “an overt act of one 
partner may be the act of all.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Curtin v. Lataille, 527 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I. 1987).  The plaintiff 
urged the court to adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) definition 
of concerted action, as opposed to the criminal law definition, which requires 1) 
aider and abettor to share the intent of the principal and 2) the existence of 
community of unlawful purpose.  Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190–93 (1976) (noting 
the widespread recognition of aiding and abetting in securities law violations but 
instead establishing defendant’s liability on direct violation of 10-b instead of 
assisting another’s violation of 10-b); Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (stating that rule derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
876(b) and used in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761, 767 (1957), 
which established “a defendant's liability for furnishing funds to a corporation 
when it knew the corporate assets were being used for the personal advantage of 
the president and director” has been adopted in New Jersey as the standard for 
liability); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978) 
4
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Courts reviewing claims of aiding and abetting in civil actions 
turn to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876, which sets 
forth the elements of three distinct forms of concerted action.13  
Subdivision (b) provides that “for harm resulting to a third person 
from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he 
. . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself.”14  Although the three forms of concerted action 
are differentiated according to the type of participation the person 
who is accused of acting in concert has with the primary tortfeasor, 
liability in substance is the same for all.15 
Liability imposed on a secondary actor who provides 
substantial assistance to or encourages a primary actor in 
committing a tort furthers two purposes of tort law: first, to 
compensate the victim; and second, to hold responsible those who 
give moral support to the primary tortfeasor.16  “Advice or 
encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor 
and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same 
effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical 
assistance.”17 
Although the Restatement doesn’t specifically refer to aiding 
and abetting, section 876(b) sets forth the factors to which courts 
turn for guidance in determining whether a secondary actor is 
(reviewing aiding and abetting claim against bank for knowingly assisting 10-b 
violation). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).  Although subdivision (b) 
does not specifically refer to “aiding and abetting”, it guides courts in aiding and 
abetting analyses.  Subdivisions (a) and (c) do not come within the ambit of aiding 
and abetting.  One is subject to liability under subdivision (a) if she “does a 
tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him.”  
Under subdivision (c), one is subject to liability if she “gives substantial assistance 
to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately 
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” 
 14. See id. § 876(b); Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 241, 251–54, 255 (2005). 
 15. See Herman, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (stating that all who act in pursuance of 
common plan to commit a tortious act, including actively taking part in it, 
furthering it by cooperating or by lending or aiding encouragement to wrongdoer, 
are equally liable to the plaintiff). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 17. Id. § 876 cmt. d (stating that liability imposed on one who gives 
encouragement to another in commission of tortious act is the same as that which 
is imposed upon tortfeasor).  See also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477–78 
(D.C. Cir. 1983).  Halberstam is a seminal case addressing multiple aspects of aiding 
and abetting liability.  Id. 
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liable for the tort of aiding and abetting.18  In generating a test for 
aiding and abetting actions, courts pull three common elements 
out of subdivision (b),  including: (1) a tortious act of a primary 
actor; (2) the secondary actor’s knowledge of the primary actor’s 
tortious act; and (3) the secondary actor’s substantial assistance or 
encouragement in the primary actor’s commission of the tortious 
act.19  As straightforward as this test appears, courts’ applications of 
the test vary immensely.  Courts generally do not have a problem 
applying the first element as establishing a tortious act is required 
to find the primary actor liable for the tort.20  The differences arise 
primarily in each jurisdiction’s interpretation of what constitutes 
knowledge and substantial assistance or encouragement.21 
A. The Knowledge Element Generally 
For a secondary actor to be liable for aiding and abetting, the 
secondary actor must have knowledge of the primary actor’s 
unlawful conduct.22  The language of the Restatement suggests that 
the secondary actor must know that the primary actor’s conduct 
results in breaching a duty owed to a third party.23  The secondary 
actor’s mistaken belief that the primary actor’s conduct is benign, 
therefore, will not amount to aiding and abetting liability.24 
The requisite finding of knowledge depends on how a court 
defines “knowledge.”  The Restatement offers no assistance to 
courts as it fails to define the term, and courts have difficulty 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b). 
 19. See generally Combs, supra note 14, at 257–62 (comparing the differences 
among courts in interpreting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) and 
distinguishing between conspiracy and aiding and abetting). 
 20. Id. at 279–80 (stating that “[i]n most cases, duty turns upon traditional 
principles, and the existence of a duty poses no substantial inquiry.  If the primary 
actor owes no duty to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot establish an aiding 
and abetting claim against the defendant.”). 
 21. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87 
(Minn. 1999) (acknowledging the differences among jurisdictions in interpreting 
knowledge and substantial assistance). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 23. Id.  “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other's conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty.”  Id. 
 24. See Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (holding that secondary actor’s belief that the primary actor’s conduct was 
reasonable thwarts knowledge finding for aiding and abetting liability). 
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elucidating knowledge in the context of aiding and abetting.25 The 
standards that courts use vary from constructive knowledge to 
actual knowledge.26  Whether a court applies a “looser” standard of 
knowledge, either expressly or indirectly by failing to strictly 
construe the higher standard of knowledge, may reflect the 
underlying policy that the court is attempting to further.27  For 
example, in reviewing a claim under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), the court applied a constructive 
knowledge standard to impose liability on a project manager for 
“knowingly participating” in a breach of fiduciary duty.28  The 
liberal standard derived from the common law of trusts, where the 
 25. See, e.g., FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 429 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(recognizing that “the content of the test is still being delineated by the courts, 
with its significance not yet fully elaborated, by its nature the test is closely focused 
on the facts of each case . . . .”); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 
1985) (stating that “[b]ecause the theory of aiding-and-abetting liability is a matter 
of common law, the courts have not yet elaborated the full meaning of [§ 876] 
factors.”).  See generally Combs, supra note 14, at 264–67 (noting that the “judicial 
test” derived from pre-Central Bank securities law, changes the knowledge inquiry 
from the secondary actor “[knowing] that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach 
of duty” to the secondary actor having a general awareness of “his role in another’s 
wrong” and of “the way in which his conduct is contributing to the wrong.”). 
 26. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004) (defining knowledge as 
“[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in 
which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact”; reckless 
knowledge as “[a] person’s awareness that a prohibited circumstance may exist, 
regardless of which the person accepts the risk and goes on to act”; constructive 
knowledge is described as “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or 
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person,” 
i.e. “the court held that the partners had constructive knowledge of the 
partnership agreement even though none of them had read it.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 
1992) (using constructive knowledge standard to find defendant liable for 
knowingly participating in breach of trust; the objective of ERISA's fiduciary 
provisions was to make applicable the law of trusts and establish uniform fiduciary 
standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan assets and to 
provide effective remedies for breaches of trust), overruled on other grounds by 
Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., Inc., 329 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that ERISA 
does not explicitly provide equitable relief against acts by non-fiduciaries, 
preempting state common law claims against non-fiduciaries for ERISA violations).  
Although Diduck may no longer be relied on as precedent, it exemplifies how 
standards of knowledge may be used to affect certain results.  See generally Richard 
C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135 (2006) 
(discussing standards of knowledge and substantial assistance in aiding and 
abetting analyses of securities, Greenmail, attorneys, banking transactions, RICO, 
trusts, and corporations). 
 28. Diduck, 974 F.2d at 283. 
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policy of protecting a dependent and vulnerable beneficiary from 
fiduciary misdeeds warrants the use of a lower standard.29 
Despite the of the intangible nature of some actions like fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty and the difficulty in showing actual 
knowledge of the unlawful conduct,30 actual knowledge is the 
prevailing standard set forth by most courts in analyzing aiding and 
abetting claims.  Actual knowledge generally requires the 
secondary actor to be “pretty sure” that the primary actor’s conduct 
is unlawful and that the secondary actor’s own conduct assists or 
encourages the primary actor.31  This standard is typically very 
difficult to prove.  Courts that apply the actual knowledge standard 
will do so when determining whether a professional providing 
service in her field of specialty is liable for aiding and abetting.32 
In addition to determining what standard of knowledge 
applies to aiding and abetting, courts must decide the extent to 
which the secondary actor is liable for third party injuries.  The 
secondary actor’s knowledge may extend to the primary actor’s 
tortious acts, which were not necessarily known but were 
foreseeable in light of the circumstances.  For example, in 
Halberstam v. Welch, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held 
that a live-in companion of the primary actor was liable for a death 
that resulted from the primary actor’s burglary of a home.33  In 
establishing the secondary actor’s knowledge of the primary actor’s 
burglarizing activities, the court stated that: 
[The primary actor’s] pattern of unaccompanied evening 
jaunts over five years, his boxes of booty, the smelting of 
 29. Id. at 282–83 (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 297 cmt. a 
(1935), which states that a person has notice of a breach when “he knows or 
should know of the breach . . . .”). 
 30. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation: 
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
213, 236–37 (1996) (discussing the elusive nature of actual knowledge and the 
difficulty of establishing actual knowledge in aiding and abetting situations). 
 31. See Hashimoto v. Clark, 264 B.R. 585, 599 (D. Ariz. 2001) (stating that 
evidence which, in retrospect, would raise red flags as to primary actor’s unlawful 
conduct, is inconclusive as to the degree of knowledge that the secondary actor 
had at the time of the breach). 
 32. See Witzman v. Lehrmen, Lehrmen & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87 
(Minn. 1999) (stating that courts that recognize aiding and abetting in 
professional contexts rely on strict interpretation of the elements to preclude 
meritless claims). 
 33. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that 
secondary actor was liable in wrongful death action under the theories of aiding 
and abetting and conspiracy). 
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gold and silver, the sudden influx of great wealth, the 
filtering of all transactions through [the secondary actor] 
except payouts for goods, [the secondary actor’s] collusive 
and unsubstantiated treatment of income and deductions 
on her tax forms, even her protestations at trial that she 
knew absolutely nothing about [the primary actor’s] 
wrongdoing—combine to make the district court’s 
inference that she knew he was engaged in illegal 
activities acceptable, to say the least.34 
Instead of limiting the secondary actor’s knowledge to 
knowledge of the act of burglarizing, the court broadened the 
conduct of which the secondary actor had knowledge by defining 
the primary actor’s act as a “criminal enterprise.”35  Therefore, the 
secondary actor was liable for all foreseeable incidents arising from 
the criminal enterprise.36 
B. Substantial Assistance Generally 
After the court finds that a secondary actor had knowledge of 
the primary actor’s breach of duty, the court must determine if the 
secondary actor substantially assisted or encouraged the primary 
actor in breaching the duty.37  Whether the secondary actor’s 
conduct amounts to substantial assistance is dependent on the 
jurisdictions’ various applications of the element.  Even the terms 
that courts use when referring to this third element are not 
uniform.38 
In torts that involve physical injury or property damage, the 
existence of the third element is often apparent.  The secondary 
actor’s conduct consists of either direct words or acts that are in 
proximity both in place and in time to the primary actor’s wrongful 
conduct.39 
 34. Id. at 486. 
 35. Id. at 488. 
 36. Id. at 487–89. 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 38. See Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (knowing 
participation); see also S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 
1987) (knowing assistance).  See generally Bryan C. Barksdale, Redefining Obligations 
in Close Corporation Fiduciary Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
the Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Squeeze-outs, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551, 559–60 
(2001) (evaluating elements of knowledge and substantial assistance in the 
squeeze-out contexts in Oregon and California). 
 39. See, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (aiding and 
abetting a battery where secondary actor’s words encouraged primary actor’s 
9
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Substantial assistance does not require physical acts; advice or 
encouragement may be sufficient to find a secondary actor liable 
for aiding and abetting.40  For example, in Rael v. Cadena,41 a 
secondary actor was liable for aiding and abetting a battery when 
he encouraged the primary actor by yelling “[k]ill him” and “[h]it 
him more!”42  Unfortunately, in more complex situations, 
substantial assistance or encouragement is rarely as blatant as in 
Rael.  Substantial assistance or encouragement is often indirect 
both in time and place, and courts often struggle with the analysis.43 
The determination of whether a secondary actor provided 
substantial assistance or encouragement to a primary actor in 
breaching a duty is highly contextual.44  The contextual nature 
results from the fact that the relationships between primary actors 
and third parties, and the duties owed therein, are unique.  
Comment (d) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876, 
provides a framework to aid a court in evaluating whether 
secondary actor’s assistance is substantial.45  The Restatement’s 
factors include: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the 
amount of assistance given by the defendant; (3) her presence or 
absence at the time of the tort; (4) her relationship to the fiduciary; 
and (5) the defendant’s state of mind.46  In addition to these 
conduct); Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383 (Ark. 1975) (aiding and 
abetting youth’s reckless conduct found where security guard encouraged youth to 
test out a new car by driving it at high speeds); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 
(Okla. 1958) (aiding and abetting battery found where child picked up erasers 
from floor and gave erasers to other children for the purpose of throwing at 
others in class, causing nonparticipating student to sustain eye injury). 
 40. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Rael, 604 
P.2d at 823). 
 41. 604 P.2d 822 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). 
 42. Id. at 822. 
 43. See generally Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 246–54 (1996) (discussing that 
application of aiding and abetting to the S&L situation, which created further 
confusion in determining knowledge). 
 44. Id. at 235–36 (noting that in addition to the courts’ continuing struggle to 
apply the knowledge requirement, substantial assistance is difficult to ascertain 
because certain actors in certain situations may meet the elements, while other 
actors may not). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979). 
 46. Id.  The factors, which many courts use to determine substantial 
assistance, are derived from Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97–
100 (5th Cir. 1975) (addressing these factors that may be used in determining 
substantial assistance and concluding that Metro Bank was not liable for aiding 
and abetting an entrepreneur’s violation of 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
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factors, the length of the relationship between the primary actor 
and the secondary actor, as well as the duration of the secondary 
actor’s activity, may establish substantial assistance by implying an 
agreement between the two actors.47 
Substantial assistance or encouragement typically takes the 
form of affirmative acts, but some courts have found that silence or 
inaction constitutes substantial assistance.48  Nonfeasance may 
result in substantial assistance where the secondary actor 
consciously intended his silence to assist the primary actor in a 
wrongful act.49  Yet, silence or inaction does not give rise to liability 
for aiding and abetting in situations where there is no affirmative 
duty of a secondary actor to help, notify, or aid a third party.50  The 
narrow scope of cases in which silence or inaction constitutes 
substantial assistance comports with common law treatment of the 
duty to assist others.  A person’s duty to prevent injuries to third 
parties is limited to situations where there is a “special relationship” 
between that person and the injured third party.51 The application 
 47. See Halberstram v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(“Additionally, the length of time two parties work closely together may also 
strengthen the likelihood that they are engaged in a common pursuit. Mutually 
supportive activity by parties in contact with one another over a long period 
suggests a common plan.”). 
 48. See Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 624 (D. Mass. 1982) (imposing 
liability onto a joint tortfeasor who knowingly joined in committing the tort of 
false imprisonment because his “silence” encouraged the primary actor to commit 
subsequent tortious acts). 
 49. See generally Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and 
Abetting by Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 27 
(1993) (quoting SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (“Inaction may 
be a form of assistance in certain cases, but only where it is shown that silence of 
the accused aider and abetter was consciously intended to aid the securities law 
violation.”)). 
 50. See Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 238–39 (“[T]he issue is not whether the 
party directly assisted the primary tortfeasor by direct advice or support, but 
whether the actor was obligated to ‘disclose or stop another’s wrongdoing 
discovered in the performance of normal and customary business activities.’”). 
 51. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 190 (1989).  The court in DeShaney recognized that “certain ‘special 
relationships’ created or assumed by the State with respect to particular 
individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty.”  Id. at 189.  That was not the case, 
however, in the facts of DeShaney: 
No such duty existed here, for the harms petitioner suffered occurred 
not while the State was holding him in its custody, but while he was in the 
custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor. While the 
State may have been aware of the dangers that he faced, it played no part 
in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable 
to them. 
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of silence or inaction to meet the substantial assistance element is 
rare in modern-day civil aiding and abetting cases where there are 
no special relationships. 
III. AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
A. Fiduciary Duties 
1. Plain Vanilla 
The determination of whether a secondary actor aids and 
abets a primary actor’s breach of fiduciary duty is contingent upon 
the primary actor owing a fiduciary duty to the third party.52  In 
typical aiding and abetting analyses, the existence of a fiduciary 
duty is implicit.  Fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care.53  The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to be 
honest and refrain from competing with the entrustor (the person 
to whom the fiduciary owes the fiduciary duty).  The duty of care 
essentially means that the fiduciary must act carefully and 
responsibly when acting on behalf of the entrustor.54 
Historically, the presence of fiduciary duties was strongest in 
Id. at 190.  See also Pietrusiak, supra note 30, at 238–39 (“[The] general rule in 
modern tort law is that one is under no duty to prevent injury to another person, 
even if one knows the other is in danger of being injured.”). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (noting a person is 
liable if she “knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty”) (emphasis 
added).  See, e.g., Alexander v. Anstine, 152 P.3d 497, 503 (Colo. 2007) (reversing 
the lower court’s holding that under Colorado common law, a president of an 
insolvent corporation owes broad fiduciary duties, beyond “[avoiding] favoring 
their own interests over creditors’ claims,” to hypothetical judgment lien 
creditors).  The Alexander court further opined: 
[T]o determine whether [hypothetical judgment creditor] has standing 
to sue the attorneys for aiding and abetting the president's breach of 
fiduciary duty, we must determine whether judgment lien creditors may 
sue a corporation's president for a breach of fiduciary duty under 
Colorado law. To determine what claims are available to creditors, we 
now turn to an examination of the duties owed by the directors and 
officers of an insolvent corporation to the corporation's creditors. 
Id. at 501. 
 53. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121–22 (Conn. 1997) (noting 
the historical fiduciary duties of directors). 
 54. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Margiotta, 668 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982) (“‘[A]t the heart of 
the fiduciary relationship’ lies ‘reliance, and de facto control and dominance.’”). 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/1
6. EID - ADC 4/23/2008  7:40:03 PM 
2008] LAWYER LIABILITY 1189 
 
the contexts of trusts where a high degree of confidence in the 
trustee was necessary for the protection and well-being of the 
beneficiary.55  Indeed, the trust and confidence that one party 
places in another with whom there are disparities in dominance 
and in position are salient elements of the fiduciary relationship.  
The potential vulnerability of the beneficiary derives from the 
trustee’s dominant position, combined with the great degree of 
trust and autonomy the trustee is given to pursue the best interests 
of the beneficiary.56  When a trustee has the right to act for the 
beneficiary and the power to pursue the beneficiary’s objectives 
with discretion, the beneficiary is in a precarious position because 
the trustee’s power may be abused.57  A fiduciary’s breach has the 
propensity of being devastating to the beneficiary.  Determining 
whether an actor is a fiduciary, along with the concomitant duties, 
is a question of law.58  Therefore, the role of the fiduciary is a device 
courts may use in appropriate circumstances to ensure that the 
trust and confidence of a vulnerable party is not abused. 
Courts recognize fiduciary duties in a number of areas in 
addition to trusts.  Reasoning primarily by analogy, courts apply 
fiduciary principles developed through trust law to achieve 
equitable results in the various contexts.59  For example, courts 
have compared the loyalty that a trustee owes to a beneficiary to 
that which an officer of a corporation owes to the corporation.60  
Generally, in both cases, the fiduciary is barred from acting out of 
self-interest, and the entrustor exercises little control over the 
fiduciary’s daily actions, causing the entrustor to be in a vulnerable 
position.  In addition, fiduciary relationships arise in the contexts 
 55. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary 
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 895–96 (1994) (providing a historical 
analysis of fiduciary duties). 
 56. See id. at 897 (discussing the vulnerability of beneficiary). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Gliko v. Permann, 130 P.3d 155, 159–60 (Mont. 2006) (overruling a 
line of cases in which the existence of a fiduciary duty is a question of fact). 
 59. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (noting that “[a]s equity evolved, concrete rules in 
many instances supplanted the chancellors' exercise of discretion based on broad 
principles.”). 
 60. See Harold Marsh Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate 
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36–40 (1966) (describing directors’ fiduciary duties in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
13
Eid: Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeez-Outs
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
6. EID - ADC 4/23/2008  7:40:03 PM 
1190 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
of agency, bailments, guardianships, corporations and legal 
representation, among others.61 
The preceding relationships are similar to trusts in that they 
involve a fiduciary undertaking a duty to act in the best interests of 
another who has put trust and confidence in that fiduciary.62  In 
these contexts, the fiduciary is in a position of inherent power and 
responsibility where actions motivated by self-interest are 
proscribed.  Because of the potential for the fiduciary to abuse her 
power, it is necessary for the protection of the entrustor (the 
principal, the bailor, the ward, the corporation, or the client) that a 
higher level of duty be imposed upon the one in whom another has 
trusted and confided.63 
The fiduciary relationship that exists between two parties varies 
according to the context in which they arise.64  One element that 
varies among fiduciary relationships is the degree of control that 
the entrustor has over the fidicuary.  In the trust context, the 
beneficiary is relatively powerless to control the acts of the trustee; 
however, in the agency context, the principal has a great degree of 
power over the agent’s actions.65  Although the scope of duties 
between the fiduciary and the entrustor is unique to that 
relationship, an important characteristic of the aforementioned 
fiduciary relationships is the one-way fiduciary duty owed by the 
fiduciary to the entrustor. 
 61. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983) 
(examining the differences and similarities among fiduciaries and how history has 
impacted the various duties in each relationship). 
 62. Haluka v. Baker, 34 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (examining the 
agent’s duty to act in the best interests of the principal). 
 63. In addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries owe to the entrustor the duty 
of care.  Variables existent in fiduciary duties include the standard of care used by 
the fiduciary in exercising its role and the degree of control the entrustor has over 
the fiduciary.  For example, where a director of a corporation owes the duty of 
care to the corporation, the standard of conduct used to impose liability upon the 
director is gross negligence.  See generally Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d. 244 (Del. 
2000).  This is in contrast to a trustee, which must refrain from negligent conduct 
in performing its role as a fiduciary.  The duty of care is relevant in aiding and 
abetting cases because the secondary actor’s negligence alone, without knowledge 
and substantial assistance, will not give rise to liability.  As a result, in a case 
involving lawyer liability, a plaintiff’s claim is foreclosed when the lawyer assistance 
was the result of mere negligence in advising her client/defendant. 
 64. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 880–81 (distinguishing fiduciary duties in 
corporate law and those in the trust context). 
 65. Even within the agency context, the power and control that the principal 
has over the agent varies immensely according to the terms of the agreement. 
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There are some critical distinctions between the liability 
imposed on a fiduciary for directly breaching a fiduciary duty and 
that which is imposed on a secondary actor for merely assisting the 
breach.66  A fiduciary who breaches a duty may be liable to the 
entrustor, regardless of whether the breach was intentional.67  
Accordingly, a fiduciary’s negligent breach of fiduciary duty will 
amount to liability.68  A fiduciary’s liability for unknowingly or 
intentionally breaching a duty, therefore, is conceptually similar to 
strict liability because it lacks the requirement of a specific mental 
state.69  In contrast, the scope of the secondary actor’s liability is 
comparatively narrower.  A secondary actor’s negligent conduct, 
which in some way contributes to a fiduciary’s breach, will not give 
rise to liability.70 
2. Inter se Fiduciary Relationships in Closely-Held Businesses 
In the context of closely-held businesses such as partnerships, 
closely-held corporations, and limited liability companies, inter se 
duties developed and are most often at issue in situations in which 
 66. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary 
Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 901 (1994) (discussing the differences of 
primary liability and secondary liability with regard to the liability imposed on one 
who breaches a fiduciary duty and one who knowingly assists another in breaching 
a fiduciary duty). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 502–04 (Ill. 2000).  In Neade, the 
court established that a fiduciary relationship existed between the defendant 
physician and the physician’s patient.  Id.  In treating the patient symptoms, the 
physician failed to order specific tests, which resulted in the patient’s death.  Id. at 
498–99.  In examining the causes of action brought forth by the decedent’s 
estate—including breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice—the court recognized 
that although the facts the estate set forth would establish a breach of fiduciary 
duty, the court would not recognize it as a cause of action because the same facts 
and elements gave rise to a duplicative and recognized medical malpractice cause 
of action.  Id. passim.  But see JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP II, LAW OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION & INSURANCE § 3:23 (2008) (noting that 
the concept of gross negligence is the standard for determining whether the 
business judgment exercised by the board of directors was informed and thus not 
a breach of the director’s duty of care). 
 69. See Tuttle, supra note 66, at 901 (examining the broad scope of liability 
that the fiduciary faces for breaches). 
 70. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (setting forth 
the elements of aiding and abetting).  Restricting the scope of liability to conduct 
that is “knowing” is in conformity with the policy behind many courts’ use of 
actual knowledge as the requisite standard of knowledge—it is undesirable and 
unfair to hold people liable for another’s tort unless they knew what they were 
doing.  Id. 
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a gross imbalance of power exists.71  In closely-held businesses with 
decentralized management, which may include any of the 
aforementioned entities, management duties (including daily 
operating procedures and policies and general long-term business 
plans) are directly controlled by the owners.72  Co-owners may 
agree to the allocation of various means of control upon business 
formation.73  With this control comes heightened duties owed by 
those who possess it.  To guard against the majority owner exerting 
his dominance at the expense of the minority owner, co-owners 
owe each other inter se fiduciary duties.74  Inter se duties are 
distinguished from ordinary fiduciary duties owed by managers in 
that inter se duties are peculiar to the co-owners without regard to 
management position.75 
In contracts, parties dealing at arm’s length are limited only by 
the requirement that they must act in good faith; however, there is 
a distinctive difference between the duties owed by parties dealing 
at arm’s length and the duties owed by parties who are closely 
involved in a common pursuit.76  Co-owners are fiduciaries and 
although the relationship between co-owners substantially differs 
from the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary, it is still 
one that involves loyalty and care.  It is axiomatic that a higher level 
of duty should be imposed upon those who invest their labor and 
capital in a common enterprise.77  Justice Cardozo’s oft repeated 
maxim “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
 71. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 377, 383–84 (2004). 
 72. See Ann E. Conaway & Robert R. Keatinge, Fiduciary Duties of Owners and 
Managers in Closely-Held Businesses and Contractual Relationships or Co-Ownerships, 
VML0202 ALI-ABA 119, 121 (2006) (examining the fiduciary duties and 
contractual duties in small businesses). 
 73. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law 
of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) (distinguishing 
the obligations and rights of owners in closely-held corporations from 
corporations). 
 74. Id. at 1153. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are 
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.”). 
 77. See Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in 
Partnership, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 252 (2004) (noting that special relationships 
between merchants were the original source of fiduciary duties in joint ventures in 
the sixteenth century). 
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most sensitive” emphasizes the importance of fiduciary duties 
within the co-owner relationship.78 
Upon entering into a business relationship, co-owners have a 
reasonable expectation of their position and rights within the 
business.79  Reasonable expectations may derive from the terms of 
the co-owners’ agreement upon formation; however, issues that 
were not initially discussed among the co-owners may later arise 
and cause conflict.80  Indeed, in addition to express agreements, 
the conduct of the parties may give rise to reasonable 
expectations.81  To uphold a co-owner’s reasonable expectations 
and to protect the minority owner from being wrongfully excluded 
from participating in the business, some courts have imposed a 
general right not to be oppressed.82  Because oppression results 
from a majority owner depriving a minority owner of some 
reasonable expectation, courts are left to examine and sift through 
the parties’ agreements and conduct to determine what their 
reasonable expectations are.83 
Corresponding with this right is the duty of the co-owners not 
to perpetuate oppressive conduct.84  As referenced above, fiduciary 
relationships in the context of closely-held business differ from that 
of trusts.85  The interdiction of any acts by the trustee motivated by 
self-interest is not present in closely-held businesses.  In closely-held 
businesses, self-interests are present as co-owners have different 
notions of what is best for the business.86  Because majority owners 
may be in the position where they must make a business decision 
that is incongruent with the minority owner’s wishes, they are 
 78. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
 79. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1155–56 (discussing in detail the existence 
of reasonable expectations in closely-held corporations and noting the difficulty in 
this concept as owners’ reasonable expectations may conflict). 
 80. Id. at 1149 (examining McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (1934)). 
 81. Id. at 1155–56 (discussing in detail the existence of reasonable 
expectations in closely-held corporations and noting the difficulty in this concept 
as owners’ reasonable expectations may conflict). 
 82. Id. at 1151–53. 
 83. See Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled . . . But 
Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1173, 1178–79 (1996) (explaining reasonable expectations may include 
lifetime employment and compensation). 
 84. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1153 (describing the right not to be 
oppressed as direct, arising out of the relationship between the owners, not the 
relationship between the entity and the aggrieved owner). 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78. 
 86. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1157–60. 
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entitled to the right of “selfish ownership.”87  For example, in a 
leading case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,88 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts proclaimed that “the controlling 
group in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in 
establishing the business policy.”89  Therefore, majority owners may 
exercise discretion in making decisions regarding a business even if 
it harms a minority owner so long as (1) there is a legitimate 
purpose, and (2) the majority owners’ objective could not be 
accomplished through less destructive means.90 
Where selfish ownership is intertwined with the duty of loyalty, 
courts are inconsistent in their analyses of breach of fiduciary cases 
among co-owners in closely-held businesses.  The examination of 
whether a co-owner in a closely-held business has breached a 
fiduciary duty is fact intensive, and the evaluators’ individual moral 
beliefs may affect the final determination.91  Where one court finds 
a breach of fiduciary duty, another may not.92 
The inconsistencies that are prevalent among courts’ decisions 
involving fiduciary duties are indicative of the origin from which 
they arose: the English court of equity.93  Where law failed to give 
an adequate remedy for one whose trust and confidence was 
abused, equity provided relief.94  The Chancellors of the courts of 
equity had a great degree of discretion when deciding a case; 
fairness and equity prevailed over consistency and predictability.95  
This theme remains in modern day fiduciary duty analysis and 
manifests itself in the closely-held business context. 
 87. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976). 
 88. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).  
 89. Id. at 663. 
 90. Id. at 663. 
 91. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 891–92. 
 92. See, e.g., Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 7–12 (S.D. 1997) (overruling 
the trial court’s determination of oppression by applying both the reasonable 
expectations test and the burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct test). 
 93. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. 
L. REV. 1399, 1452–78 (2002) (examining the numerous fiduciary relationships 
arising out of equity courts). 
 94. Id. at 1493–94 (addressing possible remedies, in law and in equity, 
available for breaches of fiduciary duties). 
 95. See DeMott, supra note 59, at 880–82. 
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B. Lawyer’s Liability for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Breaches of fiduciary duty do not fall neatly within the 
confines of traditional tort law because a breach of fiduciary duty is 
a civil cause of action for which damages or equitable relief, such as 
disgorgement, may be awarded.96  Furthermore, depending on the 
remedy the plaintiff seeks, a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not 
necessarily give rise to a jury trial.97  Despite the equitable nature of 
fiduciary duties, breaches of these duties are likened to torts for the 
purpose of imposing aiding and abetting liability.98  The 
Restatement provides a basis of liability for those who know “that 
the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself . . . .”99  Section 876(b) provides the foundation upon which 
most civil aiding and abetting decisions are based.  The 
Restatement’s elements—the underlying breach of duty, the 
secondary actor’s knowledge of that breach, and the secondary 
actor’s substantial assistance furthering the breach—are prevalent 
in decisions in which courts have addressed the issue of whether 
liability may be imposed for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty.100 
2. Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Lawyers 
a. Policy 
Though one who aids and abets a fiduciary in breaching a duty 
may be subject to liability, determining whether a lawyer should be 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 338 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that when 
determining whether breach of fiduciary duty claim was an action at law or in 
equity, lower court should have applied a two-part test: first, whether the action 
would have been equitable in eighteenth century England, and second, whether 
the remedy sought was equitable or legal in nature (citing Grafinanciera v. 
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989))). 
 98. See, e.g., Zastrow v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Wis. 
2006) (stating that breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty is an intentional tort and 
distinguishing it from the duty of care element of negligence which is an issue of 
carelessness). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 100. Id. 
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liable for assisting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty adds 
complexity to the aiding and abetting analysis.  The determination 
compels courts to reconcile distinct and perhaps equally important 
fiduciary relationships that conflict.  The question of whether 
lawyers should be included in the scope of secondary actors subject 
to liability for aiding and abetting is an issue of growing concern.101 
It is commonly held that lawyers do not owe duties to non-
clients.102  When a fiduciary breaches his duty of loyalty with the 
substantial assistance of his lawyer, the causes of action against the 
lawyer that are afforded to the entrustor are limited.  The lack of 
privity between the entrustor and the lawyer eliminates the 
entrustor’s ability to assert a malpractice claim against that 
lawyer.103  For example, in Spinner v. Nutt,104 the trustee’s lawyer 
failed to advise the trustee to make an investment in which there 
was a high probability of yielding a substantial profit for the trust.  
The court held that the beneficiaries of the trust were neither the 
lawyer’s clients nor intended beneficiaries of the contract.105  Thus 
the plaintiffs’ malpractice claim failed because the lawyer’s conduct 
was negligent and not intentionally done to assist the trustee in 
depriving the trust of the expected profits.106 
 101. See generally Richard Mason, Civil Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135, 
1136 (2006) (noting that civil aiding and abetting provides a cause of action 
against professionals and is increasingly being used to hold professionals liable for 
underlying torts). 
 102. See McIntosh County Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP,       N.W.2d      , No. 
A06-486, 2008 WL 598288, at *5 (Minn. March 6, 2008) (recognizing that, 
generally, “an attorney is liable for professional negligence only to a person with 
whom he has an attorney-client relationship.”).  This rule has been relaxed in 
some states.  See, e.g., Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.2d 197, 203–04 (W. Va. 2005) 
(holding that under certain circumstances a beneficiary will have standing to sue a 
lawyer for malpractice if the lawyer negligently drafts the will for which the 
plaintiff is the beneficiary); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (discerning 
that a lawyer may be liable to third party beneficiaries in certain situations). 
 103. See, e.g., Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 137–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000) (holding that a partner could not bring forth a claim for legal malpractice 
absent an “express [individual] attorney-client relationship,” but providing other 
grounds for relief to a disgruntled owner by holding that the lawyer representing 
the partnership owed direct fiduciary duties to all partners); Am. Centennial Ins. 
Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992) (examining the policy 
reasons supporting the strict privity requirement for malpractice claims). 
 104. 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994). 
 105. Id. at 544–45 (holding that trustee’s lawyers did not owe duty of care to 
beneficiaries). 
 106. Id. at 546 (stating that “[a]n allegation that the trustees acted under the 
legal advice of the [lawyers], without more, is insufficient to give rise to a claim 
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Lawyers representing fiduciaries are in a unique position, 
especially when those fiduciaries are obligated to act with 
undivided loyalty to and in the best interests of the entrustor.107 In 
these cases, a lawyer’s representation may be limited to advising the 
client in acting in his role as a fiduciary.  In light of the limited 
scope of the lawyer’s representation, it is questionable whether the 
lawyer’s representation to the fiduciary client would ever 
encompass advising the fiduciary to breach its duty to the 
entrustor108—an act that neither the lawyer nor the client has the 
right to do.  For example, where a trustee’s lawyer assists the trustee 
in depleting trust assets to pay off the trustee’s personal gambling 
debts, there is little justification for protecting the lawyer’s right to 
advise her client to act unlawfully.109 
Even a cursory review of aiding and abetting law will reveal that 
lawyers should not be immune from a court’s application of liability 
if the requisite elements of the Restatement section 876(b) are 
found.110 Although the lawyer-client relationship is a fiduciary one, 
this relationship should not negate the lawyer complying with the 
general duty to refrain from knowingly and substantially assisting 
another in violating the law.  In addition to the obvious argument 
that no one should be “above the law,” other policies provide 
cogent reasons why lawyers should be included, at least in some 
contexts, among possible aiders and abettors.  Fiduciary 
relationships are pervasive, and the widespread presence of 
that [a lawyer] is responsible to third persons for the fraudulent acts of his 
clients.”). 
 107. Generally, lawyers representing fiduciaries are not in fiduciary 
relationships with their clients’ entrustors.  See Am. Cenntennial Ins. Co., 843 S.W. 
2d at 484.  It may, however, be argued that where the client has no self-interest in 
its relationship with the entrustor, the lawyer’s advice would never fall outside the 
scope of acting in the best interests of the entrustor.  But see ABA Comm. On 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) (finding that a lawyer’s 
role is restricted to lawyer’s loyalties to fiduciary-client and that this arrangement 
allows the lawyer to understand her role in representing the fiduciary and 
encourages the client to be forthright with the lawyer). 
 108. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 598–99 (providing policy reasons why 
lawyers should be immune from liability). 
 109. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg, & Knupp, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding the beneficiary’s allegations were sufficient to state claim 
against trustee’s lawyer under exception to general rule against trust beneficiaries’ 
standing for a third party’s active participation in breach of trust). 
 110. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 601 (discussing the role lawyers play in 
clients’ breaches of fiduciary duties in closely-held businesses and advocating for 
lawyer accountability to third parties for aiding and abetting clients’ breaches). 
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fiduciary duties emphasizes their importance to modern-day 
society.  Protecting the entrustor in a fiduciary relationship furthers 
important objectives of both tort law and fiduciary law such as 
protecting the innocent party, compensating the victim, and 
encouraging socially desirable behavior.111  Trust and loyalty are 
fundamental to fiduciary relationships. 
Not all courts find the policies supporting the liability of 
lawyers persuasive.  California, for example, establishes multiple 
barriers to liability for participating in clients’ breaches.112  Similar 
to a malpractice claim, the entrustor’s ability to assert a claim 
against the lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty is often foreclosed 
due to the lack of privity between an entrustor and the fiduciary’s 
lawyer.  In addition, California’s strong public policy of protecting 
the trust and confidence existent in the lawyer-client relationship is 
exemplified by the broad scope of the agent’s immunity doctrine, 
discussed infra.113 
Despite the policies supporting lawyer immunity, the majority 
of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of a lawyer’s liability 
for assisting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty recognize that 
lawyers may be held liable.114  The scope of this liability, however, is 
quintessentially unclear.  The lack of clarity derives from both the 
lawyer’s position as a fiduciary to her client and the elusive nature 
 111. See Tuttle, supra note 55 at 901; see also John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-
Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003) (broadly categorizing the objectives of 
tort law into at least five groups: compensation-deterrence theory, enterprise 
liability theory, economic deterrence theory, social justice theory, and individual 
justice theory). 
 112. See infra Part IV. 
 113. See generally Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006) (holding that a 
lawyer acting within the scope of representation may not be held liable for aiding 
and abetting her client’s breach of fiduciary duty).  But see Tuttle, supra note 55, at 
934 (describing the underlying rationale for protecting confidentiality: the law 
protects communications between lawyer and client so that the lawyer can help 
conform his conduct to the law’s requirements); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.2(d) (2006) (“a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed 
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good 
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”).  
For more discussion regarding a lawyer’s immunity from liablity under the agency 
theory see infra Part IV. 
 114. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87 
(Minn. 1999) (stating that “most courts in addressing [aiding and abetting clients’ 
fiduciary duties] have not excluded professionals from aiding and abetting 
liability.”).  But see Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 131–35 (Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that under agency principals, attorneys are not liable for client’s 
breaches when acting within their scope of representation). 
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of the second and third elements of aiding and abetting, 
knowledge and substantial assistance. 
b. Knowledge 
The second element of aiding and abetting is the lawyer’s 
knowledge that her client’s (the primary actor) conduct constitutes 
a breach of fiduciary duty.115  Though most courts use actual 
knowledge as the standard for determining aiding and abetting 
liability to lawyers, few courts spend any significant time delineating 
what actual knowledge is and what facts support the existence of 
actual knowledge.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines actual knowledge 
as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from 
constructive knowledge” and that it exists where a person sees 
something “first hand.”116  Constructive knowledge is knowledge 
that “one using reasonable care or diligence should have.”117  
Knowledge is, therefore, contextual, “attributed by law to a given 
person.”118  Constructive knowledge requires an objective inquiry, 
as opposed to actual knowledge, which requires a subjective 
inquiry.119  Where a court employs the actual knowledge standard 
in determining liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting, “red 
flags,” which should alert the lawyer to her client’s breach, may not 
be enough.120  The requirement of actual knowledge, therefore, 
 115. For more discussion of the knowledge element of aiding and abetting see 
infra Part III. 
 116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).  See also In re Lee Memory 
Gardens, Inc., 333 B.R. 76, 80 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2005) (having knowledge means 
“[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in 
which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence about a fact.” 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004))). 
 117. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Combs, supra note 14, at 283 n.204. 
 120. See Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 83 
(5th Cir. 2001) (“to act knowingly means to act with actual knowledge. This means 
that [the plaintiff] must prove that [the defendant] actually knew two things: that 
[the primary actor] owed a fiduciary duty to [the plaintiff] and that [the primary 
actor] was breaching that duty.  It is not enough for [the plaintiff] to show that 
[the defendant] would have known these things if it had exercised reasonable 
care.”).  But see McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 43–44 (noting that in 
analyzing the requirement of actual knowledge, plaintiff may prove defendant had 
knowledge by circumstantial evidence, usually through a series of “red flags” that 
leads one to ask how the defendant could not have seen them along the way, but 
recognizing that “[t]here is a danger in such a must-have-known analysis . . . [in 
that] the secondary actor's alleged awareness of the fraud is subjected to the 
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guards against a lawyer being obligated to investigate any 
reasonably questionable business decisions of her client. 
Where there is an obvious breach of fiduciary duty, a court 
could easily find the requisite degree of knowledge to impose 
aiding and abetting liability onto a lawyer without making a lawyer 
an investigator with respect to her client’s business decisions.  An 
obvious breach is more likely to exist when a fiduciary’s primary 
objective is to act in the best interests of the entrustor because 
conduct that falls outside of the scope of what is considered “in the 
best interests” is evident.121  A lawyer’s exposure to aiding and 
abetting liability when the boundaries of the fiduciary’s conduct 
are clear is exhibited in the trust context.  For example, in a 
situation where a trustee commingles trust assets with his own and 
takes from the trust in order to pay personal debts, the fiduciary’s 
conduct is clearly outside the scope of what is in the best interests 
of the beneficiary.122  The underlying breach is quickly detected.  
Therefore, where a lawyer assists the trustee in acting in a way that 
is contrary to the trustee’s role as a fiduciary, the second element of 
aiding and abetting—knowledge of the underlying breach—is 
more easily found. 
The ease with which courts find knowledge of underlying 
obvious breaches is exemplified in In re Senior Cottages of America, 
LLC.123  In that case, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint 
adequately stated an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty 
claim against the lawyer.124  The primary actor was a manager, 
governor, and majority owner of Senior Cottages of America, 
LLC.125  Senior Cottages was an insolvent limited liability company 
scalpel of the legal dissector, not from the vantage of foresight, but from the 
perspective of omniscient hindsight.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
207, 213 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “[s]urreptitiously contacting the opposing 
party and offering to dismiss a client's action or forego filing a valid cause of action 
in return for payment of fees directly to the attorney, creates a conflict of interest 
and constitutes an obvious breach of the attorney's fiduciary obligation to the 
client.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 122. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding 
that the beneficiary’s allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under an 
exception to the general rule against the trust beneficiaries asserting claims 
against third parties). 
 123. 482 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the lower court’s conclusion that 
bankruptcy trustee lacked standing to assert claims against manager and attorney 
for aiding and abetting). 
 124. Id. at 1007. 
 125. Id. at 999. 
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that operated nursing homes eligible for low-income housing tax 
credits.126  Before filing bankruptcy, the majority owner formed an 
independent limited liability company to benefit from the tax 
credits.127  Instead of finding an arm’s-length buyer, the majority 
owner transferred Senior Cottages’s assets to the independent 
limited liability company.128  The independent company did not 
give a “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the credits and 
this arrangement was found to be fraudulent.129  The majority 
owner stripping the business of its assets constitutes an obvious 
breach of fiduciary duty to the business.  Therefore, it had to have 
been obvious to the lawyer when the lawyer advised the majority in 
structuring the arrangement that depleted Senior Cottages’s 
assets.130 
c. Substantial Assistance 
In general, for a lawyer to be liable for aiding and abetting her 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty, the lawyer must provide 
substantial assistance in furtherance of that breach.131  In practice, 
liability may turn on how much substantial assistance is enough.132  
Similar to the challenges that courts face in grasping the 
knowledge element, courts find difficulty in the ambiguity of the 
substantial assistance element.  This difficulty is evidenced in 
reviewing the various applications of the third element. 
 126. Id. at 999–1000. 
 127. Id. at 1000. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (referring to findings of an earlier Minnesota state court decision, 
DKM II, Inc. v. Senior Cottages of America, LLC, No. 98-16654 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 
12, 2000), and stating that decision was incorporated by reference in the amended 
complaint). 
 130. Id. at 1007.  The complaint plead that the majority owner: 
[B]reached his fiduciary duties to Senior Cottages in stripping the 
company of its assets without reasonable compensation; that [law firm] 
knew that [majority owner’s] actions were in breach of his fiduciary 
duties; and that [law firm] provided substantial assistance to [majority 
owner] and advised its client, Senior Cottages, to conclude the 
transaction.  These allegations are sufficient to plead a claim for aiding 
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Id. 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (requiring substantial 
assistance for civil aiding and abetting liability). 
 132. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing a 
detailed analysis of substantial assistance finding). 
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Some courts refer to substantial assistance as knowing 
participation, the gravamen of an aiding and abetting claim.133  
These courts drop the descriptor “substantial” and replace it with 
the descriptor “knowing.”134  This modification creates a 
redundancy of the second element and might signal that less 
substantial participation might suffice to impose liability.135  Despite 
the absence of the word substantial, courts’ analyses in reviewing 
aiding and abetting claims against lawyers have not significantly 
changed.  These cases do illustrate the semantic problems courts 
have with the ambiguous standards. 
In determining whether the facts support the existence of a 
lawyer’s substantial assistance, courts turn to the factors in 
comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) 
for guidance.136  The first factor, the nature of the act encouraged, 
 133. See, e.g., Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). In 
Holmes, the court explained that: 
The gravamen of a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary 
duty is the defendant’s “knowing participation” in the fiduciary’s 
breach of trust; wrongful intent is not necessary as the factfinder is 
required only to “find that the [defendant] knew of the breach of duty 
and participated in it.” 
Id. (quoting S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 134. See, e.g., Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 483 F. Supp. 2d 864, 878 
(D. Ariz. 2007) (holding that a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary 
duty requires “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of that duty; 
(3) knowing participation by the non-fiduciary; and (4) damages.” (citations 
omitted)).  See also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002) 
(providing that “[l]egal authorities . . . are unanimous in expressing the 
proposition that one who knowingly aids another in the breach of a fiduciary duty 
is liable to the one harmed thereby.”); Young, 885 P.2d at 308–09 (acknowledging 
that a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires 
“(1) breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to [a] plaintiff, (2) [a] defendant’s 
knowing participation in the breach, and (3) damages.”). 
 135. See Combs, supra note 14, at 267 (describing the changing elements of the 
judicial tests). 
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).  In pertinent part, 
comment d provides the following guidance: 
The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so slight 
that he is not liable for the act of the other. In determining this, the 
nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the 
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation 
to the other and his state of mind are all considered. . . . [A]lthough a 
person who encourages another to commit a tortious act may be 
responsible for other acts by the other, ordinarily he is not liable for 
other acts that, although done in connection with the intended 
tortious act, were not foreseeable by him. 
Id. (internal cross-references omitted). 
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is essential to establishing the type of assistance that would matter 
in terms of furthering the client’s tortious conduct.137  Since 
breaches of fiduciary duties occur in multiple contexts, breaches 
vary.  Depending on what is necessary for the breach to occur, a 
fiduciary may require some specialized knowledge held by the 
lawyer. 
The substantial assistance analysis benefits, perhaps, from 
evaluating the third element, the amount of the lawyer’s assistance 
to her client, with the second element, knowledge.138  Generally, 
where lawyers are involved, neither silence nor inaction meets the 
threshold of substantial assistance.139  In addition, some courts have 
stated that the performance of ordinary and routine professional 
services like drafting documents or even advising clients does not 
constitute substantial assistance.140  For example, in an analogous 
context in which an accountant provided services such as preparing 
financial statements, setting up accounts, recording conveyances, 
and providing tax advice, the court deemed these services as 
“routine” and therefore not substantial assistance.141  The analysis of 
an accountant’s liability is applicable to lawyers because lawyers and 
accountants are similarly situated as professionals owing fiduciary 
duties to their clients.142  Moreover, in both professions, a variety of 
 
 137. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84 (noting that in a physical battery case, a 
defendant’s “war cry” for continued beating may have contributed to the 
assaulter’s rage). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979). 
 139. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 19–20 (stating that “action is a 
necessary predicate for substantial assistance” and therefore “silence or inaction is 
legally insufficient”). 
 140. Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Minn. 
1999). 
 141. Id. (noting that generally professionals performing routine services 
should not be held liable for the torts of their clients).  But see Thornwood, Inc. v. 
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that 
communicating the competitive advantages available to the company to other 
parties, but specifically not to the plaintiff; reviewing and counseling the plaintiff’s 
former partner with regard to the production of investment offering memoranda, 
financial projections, and marketing literature, which purposely failed to identify 
plaintiff as a partner; and drafting, negotiating, reviewing, and executing 
documents, including the releases relating to the purchase of plaintiff’s interest, 
may constitute substantial assistance in an aiding and abetting claim). 
 142. See Malmsteen v. Berdon, LLP, 477 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (S.D.N.Y 2007) 
(holding that although “[c]ourts do not generally regard the accountant-client 
relationship as a fiduciary one, where the allegations include knowledge and 
concealment of illegal acts and diversions of funds . . . a [breach of fiduciary duty] 
cause of action against an accountant will be permitted to stand.”) (internal 
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services are performed, some of which require the professional to 
go beyond merely filling out forms. 
For the proposition that the performance of routine services is 
not substantial assistance, courts often cite to dicta in the 
Massachusetts case Spinner v. Nutt.143  In Spinner, the beneficiaries of 
a trust alleged that the lawyer’s legal advice to his client, a trustee, 
induced the trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty.144  In refusing to 
impose liability on the trustee’s lawyers for aiding and abetting the 
trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty, the court stated that legal advice 
alone was insufficient to hold lawyers liable.145  The Spinner court’s 
recital of the facts indicates that in advising the trustees, the lawyers 
were merely negligent and did not intentionally further the 
breach.146  This distinction is important because it addresses the 
limitation on a secondary actor’s liability when acting negligently.  
Indeed, it is plausible that Spinner relieves negligent lawyers of 
liability but still holds open the possibility of a lawyer’s ordinary 
and routine services constituting substantial assistance if 
intentionally done to aid a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.147 
3. Aiding and Abetting in Closely-Held Businesses 
a. Introduction to Squeeze-Outs 
The liability of lawyers for aiding and abetting breaches of 
fiduciary duties in the contexts described above extends to the 
context of closely-held businesses.  In contrast to the aiding and 
abetting analysis in “plain vanilla” breaches of fiduciary duty, the 
aiding and abetting analysis in closely-held businesses is less clear 
 
quotations and citations omitted); CPJ Enterprises, Inc. v. Gernander, 521 N.W.2d 
622, 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “[t]he lawyer-client relationship is 
jealously guarded and restricted to only those two parties because it is a fiduciary 
relationship of the highest character.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189 (citing Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 
542, 546 (Mass. 1994) for the proposition that “substantial assistance” means 
something more than routine professional services). 
 144. Spinner, 631 N.E.2d. at 546. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(distinguishing lawyers rendering “professional advice” and defendant lawyer 
advising client in how to transfer escrowed insurance premiums “off shore” to 
purchase illegal Swiss insurance policies), rev’d on other grounds, 152 P.3d 497 
(Colo. 2007). 
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due to the unique nature of the duties owed by majority owners.148  
Proving that the lawyer had actual knowledge of the breach of duty 
adds even more complexity to the aiding and abetting analysis. 
When entering into a closely-held business, a minority owner 
has certain reasonable expectations with regard to ownership and 
control.149  By virtue of the majority owner’s position as the majority 
interest holder, the majority owner has control of the business.  To 
protect the minority owner from the majority owner’s abuse of that 
control, the majority owner owes the duty not to use his power to 
oppress the minority owner by acting contrary to the minority 
owner’s reasonable expectations.150  If the majority owner fails to 
adhere to his duty not to oppress, a squeeze-out occurs. 
A squeeze-out is essentially a majority owner’s use of control 
over the business to eliminate or reduce minority owners’ interests 
in the business; a majority owner’s actions are at the expense of a 
minority owner’s reasonable expectations.151  Majority owners exert 
their control to accomplish a squeeze-out by applying one or 
several mechanisms.152  For example, a majority owner may 
terminate a minority owner’s position of employment or use voting 
power to weaken a minority owner’s control over business affairs.  
Majority owners may also decide to withhold or restrict dividends 
while increasing their own salaries.153  When a majority owner uses 
more than one mechanism, squeeze-outs can become complex. 
 148. See generally Part III.A.2. 
 149. Kleinberger, supra note 73, at 1155–56. 
 150. Id. at 1153. 
 151. See F. HODGE O’NEAL AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S 
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 1.01, at 1–2 (rev. 2d 
ed. 2005). 
 152. See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited 
Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 517–538 (1995) (examining provisions in 
partnership law and corporation law that have promoted or inhibited squeeze-
outs, and discussing which provisions should be included in limited liability 
company statutes to minimize risk of member squeeze-outs). 
 153. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 151, §§ 3–5. Other squeeze-out 
mechanisms include: siphoning off corporate earnings by leases and loans 
favorable to the majority; siphoning off a corporation’s profits by having other 
enterprises perform services; fraudulent or unfair contracts; appropriation of 
corporate assets, contracts, or credit for personal use; corporation’s purchase of 
shares from majority shareholder at a high price; dilution of minority’s interest 
through issuance of stock; withholding information; and changing rights through 
charter amendments.  Id. 
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Squeeze-outs occur for a variety of reasons.154  In general, a 
majority owner’s improper motivation lies at the root of 
oppression.  Improper motivation may arise from dissention among 
the co-owners of the business. 155 Common types of discord include 
the co-owners disagreeing on valuing the interest of the shares,156 
the entry of a minority owner into a competing business, the co-
owners’ failure to appreciate the problems with a change in 
control,157 or the drive of one owner with superior talent to advance 
in the business.158  In addition, oppression may be motivated 
entirely by a majority owner’s greed or desire for power.159 
The majority owner’s desire to gain control at the expense of 
the minority owner’s reasonable expectations induce some 
squeeze-outs, but legitimate business purposes motivate others.160  
Majority owners have a certain degree of latitude to make decisions 
in furtherance of their own interests and to act on behalf of the 
business.161  For example in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 
the majority dealt with a derelict minority owner by discharging the 
minority owner from his position in the business.162  The minority 
owner filed suit against the business and the majority owner 
claiming that the majority owner’s actions constituted 
 154. See id. § 2.01 at 2 (“The underlying causes of squeeze-outs are not always 
clear.”). 
 155. Id. § 2.02. 
 156. See id. § 2.16 at 46 (noting that multiple factors will affect the price at 
which the majority owners and minority owners value the business). 
 157. Id. § 2.12 at 32 (stating that because withdrawing owners have usually 
acquired a specific skill in the particular business, existing owners frequently see 
employment in a similar line of business). 
 158. Id. § 2.06 at 15 (quoting an anonymous lawyer that “a typical scenario of 
this includes: ‘Our client ___ was lazy and dumb. The defendant ___ was energetic 
and sharp. There was no fraud involved.’ ”); § 2.06 at 16 (stating that “[i]n the 
long run, the capable tend to gain the upper hand” and that “[e]ven in a family 
corporation, the dominant business person in the family often eventually pushes 
out less able relatives, diminishes their participation, or excludes them from new 
opportunities which arise out of the enterprise.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Goben v. Barry, 676 P.2d 90, 97 (Kan. 1984) (stating that the 
owner’s actions including failing to account or divide the property, increasing his 
own salary, concealing withdrawals, and denying co-owner’s interest in the 
company were motivated “solely [by] monetary gain.”). 
 160. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 151, § 2.11 at 3. 
 161. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976). 
 162. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561–62 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1979) (holding that there was no oppressive action toward plaintiff by 
controlling owners). 
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oppression.163  The minority owner claimed that he had an 
expectation of a management position in the business and that the 
majority owner’s action infringed on this expectation.164  The court, 
however, found no oppression because the minority owner failed to 
“learn the business,” a condition precedent to his employment in 
the company.165 
There may be several legitimate reasons why a majority owner 
would want to distance himself and the business from the minority 
owner.  For example, if a minority owner ages and experiences 
correlative health issues, his decreased capacity to work could have 
a harmful effect on the business.166  But regardless of the majority 
owner’s motive, if the majority owner pursues his self-interest in a 
way that is unfair to the minority owner, it is wrongful.  If, in 
Exadaktilos, the co-owners didn’t agree that the minority owner’s 
employment and right to manage was contingent on his satisfactory 
performance in the business, the court may have found oppression. 
Oppression occurs when proper motivation—a legitimate 
business purpose—is improperly executed.167  For example, in 
Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., the minority owner was 
involved in a sexual harassment claim that allegedly caused the 
business to suffer.168  After the claim arose, the majority owners 
began the minority owner’s removal by limiting the minority 
 163. Id. at 554. 
 164. Id. at 556. 
 165. Id. at 561–62. 
 166. See, e.g., Bermann v. Meth, 258 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1969). Here the minority 
owner brought a derivative action on behalf of closely-held business against an 
owner whose age and ill health caused him to reduce the number of hours each 
day he worked.  In reviewing the trial court’s decision that the defendant’s salary 
constituted corporate waste, the court found that even though the defendant was 
not contributing the same amount of time and labor to the corporation as he did 
before he became ill, his salary, which was comparable to that of years past, was 
not excessive. 
 167. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) 
(holding that “actions to date of majority owners with respect to minority [owner ] 
essentially excluded from all participation in operation, management, or profits of 
the corporation by reason of that owner's alleged dishonest acts were not so 
‘oppressive,’ that is, burdensome, harsh, or wrongful, as would warrant dissolution 
of the corporation” but that “court had discretion to fashion other appropriate 
remedy to protect rights of minority [owner].”). 
 168. Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that the minority owner’s reasonable expectations were not caused 
by his sexual harassment claim but were frustrated by the majority owners’ 
actions). 
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owner’s activity in running the business.169  The majority then 
terminated the minority owner’s employment and withheld 
compensation while refusing to buy the minority owner’s shares for 
anything less than half the book value.170  In addition, the majority 
fired the minority owner’s grandson, Royal, from his position as 
director.171 The court, proclaiming North Carolina’s reputation of 
being “a pioneer and ‘shining light’ in the protection of minority 
[owner] rights,” found the majority’s conduct oppressive.172  The 
minority owner’s reasonable financial and managerial expectations 
were unrelated to the sexual harassment charge.173  The majority’s 
actions, therefore, “manifest[ed] an intent to control the company 
without any minority [owner] or director input.”174 
b. Complexity of Squeeze-outs 
When the majority owner desires to disguise the oppression of 
the minority owner, squeeze-outs become complex.  The level of 
sophistication needed to avoid an obvious breach of fiduciary duty 
requires expertise.  The majority owner’s ability to orchestrate 
squeeze-outs requires strategy and other technical assistance that 
lawyers are well-equipped to provide.  An example of strategic 
complexity is found in Aranki v. Goldman & Associates.175  In Aranki, 
the majority owner’s lawyer assisted the squeeze-out of the minority 
owner by initiating a lawsuit, the merits of which were questionable, 
against the minority owner for theft and conversion.176  At the same 
time, the lawyer advised the majority to place the minority in 
default of a personal loan between the two parties.177  The sequence 
of events in the squeeze-out was designed to deplete the minority’s 
funds, leaving him vulnerable to unfair settlement terms.178 
 169. Id. at 517. 
 170. Id. at 517–18. 
 171. Id. at 517. 
 172. Id. (citing Robert Savage McLean, Minority Owners' Rights in the Close 
Corporation under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
1109, 1125–26 (1990)). 
 173. Id. at 520–21. 
 174. Id. at 521. 
 175. 825 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 176. Id. at 511–12. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (holding that the complaint set forth facts that would show that the 
defendants colluded to freeze plaintiffs out of “company's management and profit 
sharing” and “force them to surrender, at reduced price, their minority 
membership interest in company” and that the allegations were sufficient to bring 
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/1
6. EID - ADC 4/23/2008  7:40:03 PM 
2008] LAWYER LIABILITY 1209 
 
The need for expertise in accomplishing a squeeze-out is also 
evident in the level of technical complexity of squeeze-outs.  For 
example, in Granewich v. Harding, the majority owner attempted to 
oust the minority owner by removing him from employment.179  
When the minority owner challenged the majority’s actions, the 
majority hired a lawyer to accomplish the squeeze-out.180  The 
lawyer’s legal expertise, shown by the lawyer advising his clients to 
call special meetings, to amend the corporate by-laws, and to issue 
stock to dilute the value of the minority’s interest, was essential to 
the oppression scheme.181 
c. Is the Client’s Conduct a Breach of Fiduciary Duty? 
In plain vanilla breaches of fiduciary duty, where the 
fiduciary’s breach is obvious, a lawyer should have no problem 
recognizing that her client’s conduct constitutes a breach.  But in 
closely-held businesses, a majority owner’s wrongful conduct 
toward the minority owner may not be obvious.  A minority owner’s 
reasonable expectations in a specific business are peculiar to the 
agreements made among the owners of the business.  Similarly, the 
legitimate business purposes of a majority owner are unique and 
highly contextual.  A minority owner’s reasonable expectations are 
often ambiguous, and a majority owner’s actions appearing to 
further legitimate business interests, could, in fact, be oppressive. 
Unless a majority owner’s breach of fiduciary duty is obvious, it 
may be difficult for an “outsider,” a court, or even a lawyer, to 
determine whether the actions of the majority owner were 
unlawful.  A court that addresses oppression, therefore, must 
forth a cause of action against the lawyers for aiding and abetting). The strategy 
described in the text was detailed in Plaintiffs-Appellant’s brief to the appellate 
court.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Aranki v. Goldman & Assoc., LLP, 825 
N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (No. 2005-11033), 2006 WL 3831020. 
 179. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 795–96 (Or. 1999) (holding that 
attorneys knew and participated in scheme to “squeeze out” minority owner, which 
resulted in breach of fiduciary duties of majority owners). 
 180. Id. at 791.  See also Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577–78 (stating that 
“[a]ttorneys routinely facilitate corporate squeeze-outs because the close 
corporation is a legal entity whose very existence derives from attorney input and 
whose rules of governance and procedures are not easily understood by laypersons 
. . . . [B]y definition, a squeeze-out involves the controlling shareholder’s 
utilization of powers of control and ‘some legal device or technique’ to remove the 
minority shareholder from the entity . . . that can only be accomplished by an 
attorney with knowledge of the statutory mechanisms authorizing such action.”) 
 181. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791–92. 
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scrutinize the facts to determine the minority owner’s reasonable 
expectations,182 and whether the majority owner, in pursuing a 
legitimate purpose, adequately yielded to those reasonable 
expectations—that is, whether the “same legitimate objective could 
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less 
harmful to the minority’s interest.”183  This determination 
necessarily precedes the aiding and abetting issue. 
An example of a situation where a majority owner’s actions 
against a minority owner seemed legitimate, but in fact constituted 
a squeeze-out, is found in Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative.184  
Leslie involved a software repair business that was owned and 
operated by the plaintiff minority owner and two other owners.185  
Upon the business’s inception, each owner emphasized a different 
area in running the business and had some degree of technical 
proficiency.186  All of the owners were employees, and to a certain 
degree their salaries reflected the amount of income each 
generated by servicing the business’s clients.187 
The minority owner conflicted with the majority over various 
issues, including the compensation scheme.188  In addition, the 
minority owner was the subject of numerous employee and client 
complaints.189  The majority owners’ dissatisfaction with the 
minority owner culminated after reading a threatening e-mail from 
 182. See Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 519 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000) (citing Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) 
(stating that “a complaining owner's reasonable expectations cannot be viewed in 
a vacuum; rather they must be examined and re-evaluated over the entire course 
of the various participants' relationships and dealings.”)). 
 183. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976) (“The majority, concededly, have certain rights to what has been termed 
‘selfish ownership’ in the corporation which should be balanced against the 
concept of their fiduciary obligation to the minority.”).  See, e.g., Bermann v. Meth, 
258 A.2d 521, 523–24 (Pa. 1969) (upholding owner’s reasonable expectations of 
compensation and concluding that even though the ailing the owner’s ability to 
work had decreased, the wages given to the ailing owner was not corporate waste). 
 184. No. 10268BLS, 2002 WL 532605 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) 
(reviewing minority owner’s claim of squeeze-out). 
 185. Id. at *1. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at *2 (stating that the business was run similarly to a law firm, with the 
owners generating “billable hours” when directly servicing clients). 
 188. At one point, the owners decided on a compensation scheme that evened 
out the owners’ salaries.  But the arrangement did not last long as the majority 
owners wanted their hard work, which was apparently disproportionate to the 
minority owner’s efforts, to be adequately compensated.  Id. 
 189. Id. at *2–3. 
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the minority owner.190  In dealing with the problematic minority 
owner, the majority owners placed the minority owner on leave and 
attempted to negotiate the minority owner’s termination.191  
Unable to reach an agreement, the majority fired the minority 
owner, voted him out of his position as director, and voted to 
eliminate dividends and replace them with employee bonuses.192 
In reviewing the minority owner’s squeeze-out claim, the court 
found that the decision to oust the minority owner as a director 
and to fire him was contrary to his reasonable expectations.193  
Although the majority may have had a legitimate business purpose, 
there were less harmful alternatives available to pursue their 
purpose, including modifying the minority owner’s job duties, 
upgrading his skills through education, and searching for a more 
“creative compensation” structure to meet his needs.194  Although 
the court did not order the minority owner’s reinstatement as an 
employee, the court directed that the minority owner receive eight 
months of severance pay and that he be reinstated as a director to 
protect his investment in the company.195  As shown in Leslie, a 
majority owner’s conduct that seems justified may still constitute 
oppression.196 
Even after scrutinizing the facts, reasonable minds may differ 
as to whether the majority’s actions constitute oppression.  For 
 190. Id. at *3–4.  In the e-mail, the minority owner stated that his wife reserved 
the right to "shoot" one of the majority owners.  The minority owner was licensed 
to carry a gun and occasionally kept a gun in the office. 
 191. Id. at *4. 
 192. Id. at *5–6. 
 193. Id. at *8. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at *9. 
 196. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994) (reviewing minority owner’s appeal of lower court’s valuation of 
minority owner’s shares in buyout).  In Pooley, three brothers owned and shared 
equal interest in a closely-held corporation. One of the brothers began to behave 
in a manner that was destructive to the business.  Id. at 836.  During a special 
owner’s meeting, two of the brothers constituting the majority voted the 
belligerent brother out as a director.  Id.  The brother, as the minority owner, 
brought suit against the majority.  Id.  The trial court concluded that despite the 
minority owner’s conduct, the majority owners deprived him of his reasonable 
expectation to participate in the management of the business.  Id.  Though 
limiting the minority owner’s exposure to patrons of the business may have been a 
legitimate business purpose, the majority could have accomplished this in a 
different manner.  The trial court’s determination that the majority owners acted 
prejudicially by freezing the minority owner out of the business was not appealed.  
Id. 
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example, in Landstrom v. Shaver, the minority owner’s views 
regarding how the corporation should be run clashed with those 
views of the majority owners.197  The minority owner sued the 
majority owners, alleging oppression.198  Prevailing in the lower 
court, the minority owner claimed that the majority was frustrating 
her reasonable expectation to manage the business. 199  In reviewing 
the majority owner’s conduct, which included not updating an 
accounting system, the court stated that the minority owner’s 
problem with the business arose out the fact that she was outvoted 
and disappointed, not oppressed.200  Shaver shows how reasonable 
minds may differ as to what constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty 
in the context of closely-held businesses. 
The intent of a majority owner to oppress a minority owner is 
also found where a majority owner uses abusive conduct to coerce a 
minority owner into giving into its demands.  In Evans v. Blesi, the 
minority owner, Blesi, and the majority owner, Evans, had been 
sole owners of their company for nearly three decades.201  When 
Blesi began having health problems, Evans expressed his concern 
that Blesi’s health may have adverse effects on the business.202 Using 
concern over Blesi’s health problems as a purportedly legitimate 
business purpose, Evans made threats, including threatening to 
dissolve and liquidate the business to persuade Blesi to transfer his 
shares of the business and resign.203  Succumbing to Evans’s tactics, 
 197. Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 9–10 (S.D. 1997) (holding that a 
showing that the minority owner had been outvoted and was subjectively 
disappointed with corporate management was insufficient to constitute 
oppression). 
 198. Id. at 2. 
 199. Id. at 10 (quoting the trial court, “[d]efendants' respective efforts in 
directing the Company, failure to pay adequate attention to safety concerns, 
deception in obtaining Landstrom's signature to the 1987 Revision, refusal to deal 
on a good faith basis with her attempts to sell her stock, disdain for her desire to 
treat employees decently, animosity toward her that they have exhibited during 
this litigation, and continued actions at annual owner meetings designed to 
prevent her from meaningfully participating in the Company, all constitute facts 
from which this Court concludes [majority owners] oppressed [minority 
owner].”). 
 200. Id. at 11–12. 
 201. Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that 
evidence was sufficient to support allegation that the majority owner breached his 
fiduciary duty to the minority owner by getting the minority owner to resign). 
 202. Id. at 778. 
 203. Id. 
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Blesi transferred the shares.204  The court found that Evans’s 
conduct toward Blesi fell short of the “highest standards of integrity 
and good faith” that owners in closely-held businesses owe to each 
other.205 
Though this case involved flagrantly offensive conduct that 
obviously constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, situations arise in 
which majority owners act quite diplomatically in oppressing 
minority owners, and breaches of fiduciary duty are not always 
clear.  When aiding and abetting claims are brought against lawyers 
in these ambiguous cases, courts face another challenging 
determination: whether a lawyer had actual knowledge of her 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
IV. FINDING A SOLUTION 
Trust is an “essential component of successful long term 
business relationship[s].”206  In closely-held businesses lies an 
inequity of bargaining power.  As such, there is a need to prevent a 
majority owner’s exploitation of a powerless minority trapped in an 
undesirable business relationship.207  Indeed, where co-owners owe 
each other the duty of the utmost good faith and loyalty,208 lawyers 
should not be allowed to perpetuate the dishonesty of majority 
owners by subverting the fiduciary relationship.209 
 204. Id. at 779–80 (noting that Evans’s secret preparation, including meeting 
with lawyers and preparing documents, was a part of a string of intimidating 
tactics, in violation of fiduciary duty to minority owner). 
 205. Id. at 779. 
 206. Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits 
of the Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 55 (2000).  See also id. n.15 (noting that 
fiduciary duties are necessary “to afford adequate protection to minority owners 
and particularly to those in closely held corporations whose disadvantageous and 
often precarious position renders them particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of 
the majority.”) (quoting Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal. 
1963)). 
 207. See Hillman, supra note 206, at 55 n.14 (noting Professor Vestal’s 
explanation that “[b]y joining the partnership, each partner agrees to advance the 
collective interest and not the short term individual interest of the partner.  This is 
not abjuration of self-interest . . . individuals elect to join a partnership because 
they calculate that they will maximize their individual long-term interest through 
the collective enterprise.”). 
 208. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). 
 209. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 58 (examining the role of lawyers in 
squeeze-outs and emphasizing the need to protect the “sanctity of the close 
corporation fiduciary relationship” by imposing liability onto lawyers who aid and 
abet squeeze-outs). 
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Cutting the opposite direction of the fiduciary duties that co-
owners owe each other is a strong argument in favor of upholding 
the trust and confidence in the lawyer-client relationship at the 
expense of other fiduciary relationships. 
[F]or individuals and corporations to obtain the advice 
and assistance that they must receive from their agents, 
the agents must have some protection from tort liability to 
third parties-assists us in determining the rule that should 
be applied in this case . . . [S]afeguarding the lawyer-client 
relationship protects more than just an individual or 
entity in any particular case or transaction; it is integral to 
the protection of the legal system itself.210 
When lawyers fear liability in performing their normal 
professional duties, such as advising their clients in pursuing 
legitimate business purposes, it may be difficult for businesses to 
find skilled lawyers whose services are affordable.  This potential 
chilling effect would greatly impact closely-held businesses since 
many of these businesses have limited resources.  For instance, in 
some jurisdictions, minority owners in closely-held businesses may 
bring actions directly instead of derivatively.211  This opens the door 
to the potential of minority owners’ abuse of majority owners.  
Small businesses that are ill-equipped to deal with the cost of 
litigation are easily influenced to settle.212  Moreover, majority 
owners who want to pursue legitimate businesses purposes may 
have difficulty in finding an affordable lawyer if the lawyer fears 
minority owner aiding and abetting suits. 
Although lawyers of majority owners are probably not in 
imminent danger of a surge of aiding and abetting lawsuits, there is 
a need for a rule that “works”: a rule that both imposes 
consequences onto those lawyers who knowingly provide 
substantial assistance to their clients in oppressing minority owners 
and shields from liability honest lawyers who are merely trying to 
 210. Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1067 (Or. 2006) (declining to impose 
liability onto a lawyer for assisting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty). 
 211. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or What's a 
Lawsuit Between Friends in an “Incorporated Partnership”, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1203, 1265 n.315 (1996). 
 212. See Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 13 (S.D. 1997) (examining the 
ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance § 701 and declining to take ALI’s 
approach of allowing all claims of owners in closely-held corporations to be 
brought directly instead of derivatively because of the large number of small, ill-
prepared business in the state). 
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assist their clients in furthering legitimate business purposes.  In 
addition, the rule must give lawyers the latitude to advise clients 
and concurrently prevent lawyers from being the necessary 
handmaidens to their clients’ squeeze-outs.  These objectives are 
sensitive to the need of preserving the trust and confidence that lie 
at the core of both the lawyer-client relationship and the 
relationships of owners in closely-held businesses. 
A. Approaches 
Approaches to imposing liability onto lawyers vary by state.  
Some approaches are over-inclusive, in that they leave innocent 
lawyers vulnerable to minority owner actions of aiding and abetting 
oppression.  In contrast, some approaches are under-inclusive 
because they fail to hold liable lawyers who knowingly assist their 
clients’ oppressive conduct.  This section surveys the approaches of 
Oregon, California, and Minnesota and shows how they fail to 
adequately address the fundamental problem in lawyer aiding and 
abetting analyses: knowledge of the squeeze-out.  Finally, this 
section ends with a solution: a rule that enables minority owners’ 
meritorious actions against lawyers to go forward but prevents 
innocent lawyers from being forced into litigation. 
1. Oregon’s Approach: Agent’s Immunity Theory 
The recent Oregon case Reynolds v. Shrock213 presents a strong 
case for upholding the lawyer-client relationship at the expense of 
other fiduciary relationships.  Reynolds arose from some peculiar 
circumstances.  The parties involved included Reynolds, a 
naturopath, and Schrock, his former patient.214  Together, the 
parties had invested in two parcels of real estate: a “lodge” property 
and a “timber” property.215  At one point, some sexual 
improprieties occurred between the two parties and Schrock sued 
Reynolds.216 
 213. 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006). 
 214. Reynolds v. Schrock, 107 P.3d 52, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
 215. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063. 
 216. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 54.  Initially, a dispute over the land occurred, and 
Schrock sued Reynolds.  Id.  Schrock then brought a separate suit for “alleged 
sexual impropriety stemming from the provider-patient relationship.”  Id.  The 
cases were soon consolidated.  Id. 
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The parties settled the lawsuit; part of the settlement included 
restructuring the ownership of the joint investment.217  Reynolds 
agreed to convey his interest in the recreational property to 
Schrock in return for a security interest in the timber property 
until the timber was sold, at which time Reynolds would obtain the 
profits of the timber sale, retaining no further interest in either 
parcel so long as he received at least $500,000.218 
After the settlement, Schrock’s lawyer advised her that she 
could sell the recreational parcel of land before the timber was 
sold.219  The settlement agreement did not require Schrock to 
retain the property to secure the possible deficiency in the sale of 
the timber.220  The lawyer then assisted Schrock in selling the 
recreational parcel and attempted to hide the sale from Reynolds 
by telling the escrow agent not to notify Reynolds of the sale.221  
When Reynolds uncovered the transaction, he sued Schrock and 
her lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty claiming that the settlement 
agreement created a relationship with Schrock that was akin to a 
joint venture and that Schrock’s actions constituted a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.222 
By the time the Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
Schrock had settled with Reynolds, leaving the lawyer as the 
remaining defendant.223  For the purpose of reviewing the lawyer’s 
liability, the parties treated the claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
and the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith, as a single 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.224 
Both Reynolds and the Oregon Court of Appeals cited a then 
recent Oregon Supreme Court case, Granewich v. Harding,225 for the 
proposition that a lawyer who knowingly and substantially assists 
her client in breaching a fiduciary duty will be held liable for that 
 217. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063–64. 
 218. Id.  Under the agreement, Schrock was required to pay the difference if 
the timber sold for less than $500,000 or Reynolds’s security interest in the 
property would remain.  Id. at 1063. 
 219. Id. at 1064. 
 220. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 54. 
 221. Id.  Interestingly, after the sale the lawyer received $135,111.71 in fees and 
Schrock received $209,440.68.  Id. 
 222. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1064. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999) (describing the elements required to hold lawyer 
who assists majority owner in squeezing-out minority owner liable for aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty). 
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breach; an initial read of Granewich seems to support that 
conclusion.226  On review, however, the Oregon Supreme Court 
distinguished Granewich and held that in the case at bar, the lawyer 
was not liable because he was acting within the scope of 
representation.227  In explaining this analysis, the court stated that 
the lawyer did not do anything that was contrary to the settlement 
agreement, and that the lawyer was otherwise acting within the 
scope of representation.228  In its decision, the court specifically 
included “assisting the client in conduct that breaches the client’s 
fiduciary duty to a third party” as within the scope of the lawyer’s 
representation.229 
In Reynolds, the privilege that Oregon granted the lawyer is an 
extension of the immunity accorded to agents acting on behalf of 
their principals; however, the privilege is misplaced in an analysis of 
a lawyer’s liability for assisting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty.230  
The agency privilege is an affirmative defense that relieves an agent 
who commits a tortious act from liability if she “exercise[es] a 
privilege held by the principal or if [she] [acts] for the protection 
of the principal’s interests.”231  As Reynolds noted, a number of 
jurisdictions afford lawyers a qualified privilege when advising a 
 226. Reynolds, 107 P.3d at 52, 58 n.4 (“[an] attorney may not ‘use his license to 
practice law as a shield to protect himself from the consequences of his 
participation in an unlawful . . . conspiracy’ and that policy ‘should prevent an 
attorney from escaping liability for knowingly and substantially assisting a client in 
the commission of a tort.’”) (quoting Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 
N.E.2d 756, 767–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 227. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1070–72 (“[T]he purpose of privilege requires that 
lawyers be able to assess the legal problems that their clients bring to them and 
discuss the full range of options . . .  lawyers must be able to assist their clients in 
implementing those solutions, to the extent that that assistance falls within the 
legitimate scope of the lawyer-client relationship.”). 
 228. Id. at 1071. 
 229. Id. at 1069. 
 230. Id. at 1068–70 (applying the agency theory of liability). 
 231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 343 (1979).  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979) (“One who otherwise would be liable for a tort is 
not if he acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege of his own or of a 
privilege of another that was properly delegated to him.”).  See, e.g, Los Angeles 
Airways, Inc. v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying privilege to 
corporation’s lawyer in claim against lawyer for inducing corporation’s contract 
with third party); Hussie v. Bressler, 504 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 
(stating that “it is well settled that ‘[a]n agent cannot be held liable for inducing 
his principal to breach a contract with a third person, at least where he is acting on 
behalf of his principal and within the scope of his authority.’” (quoting Kartiganer 
Assoc. v. Town of New Windsor, 485 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985))). 
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client amounts to an interference with that client’s contractual 
relations with a third party.232 
Although at first glance this case is about a property 
transaction, their relationship was similar to a joint venture and 
Schrock breached her fiduciary duty to Reynolds.  Regardless of 
whether the contract failed to include a provision prohibiting 
Schrock from selling the recreational parcel, Reynolds had a 
reasonable expectation that the defendant would not sell it.  
Similarly, minority owners may have reasonable expectations that 
are not found in a document.  Therefore, the failure of the court to 
impose liability on the lawyer for aiding and abetting his client’s 
breach may have adverse consequences in the context of 
oppression in closely-held businesses. 
In Schott v. Glover,233 the Illinois Court of Appeals provided a 
good analysis of the need to limit lawyers’ liability arising from 
advising their clients to breach contracts.  The plaintiff, a realty 
agency, alleged that Glover, the lawyer representing a bank, had 
caused his client to breach an exclusive agency contract that the 
realty agency had with the bank.234  In addressing the potential 
liability of lawyers for tortious interference with contractual 
relations, the court stated that a “privilege occurs where the third 
 232. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1070.  See also Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 
704, 709 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that in addition to employee’s failure to establish 
basic elements of tortious interference, “an attorney who acts within the scope of 
the attorney-client relationship will not be liable to third persons for actions 
arising out of his professional relationship unless the attorney exceeds the scope 
of his employment or acts for personal gain”); Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. P’ship v. 
Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 181–82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that  
lawyers are accorded a qualified privilege, when acting within the scope of 
attorney-client privilege to advise and act for a client even though that advice may 
cause a client not to perform a contract); Burger v. Brookhaven Med. Arts Bldg., 
516 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (stating that "an attorney is not liable for 
inducing his principal [client] to breach a contract with a third person, at least 
where he is acting on behalf of his principal within the scope of his authority,” and 
that “[a]bsent a showing of fraud or collusion, or of a malicious or tortious act, an 
attorney is not liable to third parties for purported injuries caused by services 
performed on behalf of a client or advice offered to that client"); Schott v. Glover, 
440 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a plaintiff can state a cause 
of action for tortious interference with a contract against a lawyer if the plaintiff 
can set forth factual allegations showing actual malice, and stating that “[s]uch 
allegations, however, would necessarily include a desire to harm, which is 
independent of and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his client.”). 
 233. Schott, 440 N.E.2d at 380 (holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a claim 
against bank’s attorney for tortious interference with contractual relations). 
 234. Id. at 377. 
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party acts [to] protect a conflicting interest which is considered to 
be of equal or greater value than that accorded  to the contractual 
rights involved.”235  The court recognized that the fiduciary 
relationship between a lawyer and client was one that necessitated 
this privilege: not imposing privilege would have the effect of 
creating a duty to third parties, and “[p]ublic policy requires that 
an attorney, when acting in his professional capacity, be free to 
advise his client.”236 
The application of the agent’s privilege in the context of 
tortious interference with contractual relations is warranted.237  But, 
in making the decision to hold the lawyer-client relationship 
superior to the joint venture relationship, the Reynolds court 
improperly analogizes contractual relationships to fiduciary 
relationships.  There is a vast difference between fiduciaries and 
contracting parties. 
First, as a matter of form, the underlying acts that the lawyer 
assists are different.  In aiding and abetting, a breach of loyalty has 
been compared to an intentional tort;238 however, the underlying 
conduct of an action for tortious interference with contractual 
relations is a breach of contract.239  A client has the right to breach 
a contract without incurring liability in tort.  Thus, the client’s 
privilege to breach extends to the lawyer.  In contrast, a fiduciary 
does not have the privilege to breach the duty of loyalty. 
Second, as a matter of substance, the inter se relationships of 
the parties are substantially different.  Contracting parties are 
dealing at arm’s length, whereas fiduciaries in closely-held 
businesses owe each other trust and confidence—the utmost honor 
 235. Id. at 379. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. (stating that holding lawyers liable for tortuous interference with 
contractual relations would cause lawyers to owe duties to third parties dealing at 
arm’s length and that duties to third parties would jeopardize fiduciary 
relationships between lawyer and client). 
 238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (“A fiduciary who 
commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the 
person for whom he should act.”). 
 239. See Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 1993) (setting 
forth the elements of tortious interference with contractual relations as including: 
“1) the existence of a contract, 2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the 
contract, 3) the intentional procurement of a breach, 4) the alleged wrongdoer 
acting without justification, and 5) damages.” (citations omitted)). 
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and loyalty.240  Therefore, fiduciaries must resist acting in a purely 
self-serving manner. 
Third, the sources of the duties are different.  Contractual 
obligations are created by contract terms and are owed to the 
parties of that contract, but fiduciary relationships are created by 
law and by social policy.241 
Fourth, contracts and fiduciary duties serve different 
functions.  “[T]he purpose of contract law is not to deter the 
breach, but . . . to require the breaching party to internalize the 
costs of the breach.”242  A contract may even be considered a set of 
alternative promises: the obligor promises that he will perform his 
end of the bargain or that he will compensate the loss of the 
benefit to the obligee if he breaches.243  In closely-held businesses, 
reasonable expectations formed from the trust and loyalty among 
the owners comprises the duties owed.  Although a court is able to 
put a value on a minority owner’s reasonable expectations, it may 
not replace the minority owner’s subjective view of what he lost. 
There are legitimate reasons why parties need to or should 
break contracts.  Indeed, “efficient breaches” are even encouraged 
by some economists. 244  The “immunity” solution offered by the 
Reynolds court furthers the important objective of maintaining 
confidentiality and candor between the client and lawyer.  Breach 
of contract is not necessarily “wrongful” enough to bar lawyer-client 
privilege.  Though barring lawyers from liability for tortious 
interference with contractual relations is supported by good policy, 
these policies do not easily transfer to the context of closely-held 
entities, where oppression is deemed unacceptable; a breach of 
 240. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 241. See Carl A. Pierce, Client Misconduct in the 21st Century, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 
731, 895, 895–99 (2005) (providing that fiduciary duties vary depending on the 
context in which they arise and that, some jurisdictions allow certain fiduciary 
duties to be contracted out of the business agreement; this further emphasizes that 
fiduciary duties are imposed by law, both by statute and by common law). 
 242. Id. at 900. 
 243. Id.  See also L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 
1984) (“The law has long recognized the view that a contracting party has the 
option to breach a contract and pay damages if it is more efficient to do so.”). 
 244. See Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(analyzing whether punitive damages should be awarded to the plaintiff for the 
defendant’s breach of contract and noting that “[an] explanation, offered by 
economists, is the notion that breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and 
wealth-enhancing should be encouraged, and that such ‘efficient breaches’ occur 
when the breaching party will still profit after compensating the other party for its 
‘expectation interest.’”). 
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fiduciary duty is not a violation of a mere agreement, but a 
violation of trust. 
2. California’s Approach: Gatekeeping Statute 
California case law is nearly devoid of aiding and abetting 
claims against lawyers.245  Although courts recognize the difference 
between aiding and abetting and conspiracy, attacks on lawyers for 
assisting their clients’ wrongful conduct take the form of conspiracy 
claims.246  In deciding lawyer liability cases under conspiracy law, 
California narrows the scope of a lawyer’s liability in assisting a 
client’s breach of fiduciary duty to situations in which the lawyer 
owes an independent duty to the aggrieved third party or the 
lawyer acts of outside the scope of representation by deriving a 
financial benefit from the client’s breach.247  The policy supporting 
this is the theory that for one to be liable for conspiring to breach a 
fiduciary duty, that person must owe a duty to breach.248  A lawyer, 
therefore, cannot conspire with her client to breach a fiduciary 
duty owed to a third party unless that lawyer directly owes a 
fiduciary duty. 
 245. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 591–96 (examining California’s extensive 
history of lawyer liability for assisting client’s in breaching fiduciary duties). 
 246. See Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 340 
n.10 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Despite some conceptual similarities, civil liability for 
aiding and abetting the commission of a tort, which has no overlaid requirement 
of an independent duty, differs fundamentally from liability based on conspiracy 
to commit a tort.”).  But see Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 
1126 (C.D. 2003) (stating that the bulk of California’s leading case law involving a 
person’s liability for participating in another’s breach of duty arises in the context 
of trusts and that “the cases do not clearly distinguish between claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty, conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting the 
breach of fiduciary duty.”). 
 247. See Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 260 Cal. Rptr. 
183, 186 (1989) (stating that action for civil conspiracy may not arise if alleged 
conspirator is not bound by duty to third party and acts as agent of person who 
owes a duty to third party and holding that lawyers for medical malpractice insurer 
could not be held liable for damages to plaintiff because lawyers were acting as an 
agent of insurer and did not act for their own advantage).  See also Everest 
Investors 8 v. Whitehall Real Estate Ltd. P’ship. XI, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 300–02 
(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that third party who owed no direct fiduciary to plaintiff 
could not be held liable for conspiracy); City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 342 n.14 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting 
that “[a]s a general rule, a cause of action for civil conspiracy will not arise if the 
alleged coconspirator, even though a participant in some agreement underlying 
the injury, was not personally bound by any duty violated by the wrongdoing.”). 
 248. Doctors’ Co., 260 Cal. Rptr.’ at 186. 
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An example of the judiciary’s general aversion to imposing 
liability on lawyers is found in Skarbrevik v. Cohn, England & 
Whitfield.249  In Skarbrevik, the lawyer for a closely-held business 
assisted the majority owners’ squeeze-out of a minority owner by 
advising the majority to hold a special shareholder’s meeting 
during which they could amend the by-laws and to issue additional 
stock to the majority owners thereby diluting the minority owner’s 
interest in the business.250  The majority owners did not heed the 
lawyer’s advice and took action that was unauthorized by the by-
laws.251  The lawyer covered-up his clients’ noncompliance by 
memorializing a meeting that never in fact happened and by filing 
the requisite documents with the Secretary of State.252  Despite the 
lawyer’s conduct, the court declined to impose liability onto the 
lawyer because the lawyer neither owed a duty to the minority 
owner nor did the lawyer receive any financial benefit from 
assisting the majority.253  Although the minority owner did not 
allege aiding and abetting, the seemingly bizarre outcome most 
likely would have been the same;254 California limits the legal 
obligations that lawyers owe to non-clients in a squeeze-out by 
emphasizing the lawyer’s role as an agent of the client, a position 
that fundamentally differs from other jurisdictions.255 
California’s restrictive approach to lawyer liability is further 
shown in California’s statutory law.  California Civil Code section 
 249. 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 250. Id. at 631 (reviewing the contents of a letter written by the lawyer in which 
the lawyer acknowledged that the “stock dilution plan was complicated and would 
take a longer period of time than envisioned”).  The majority’s reason for wanting 
to rid the business of the minority owner was that they “‘were unhappy with [him] 
and they could not afford to keep [him] on the books.’”  Id. at 630. 
 251. See id. at 632. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 640. 
 254. Barksdale, supra note 38, at 591–600 (commenting on Skarbrevik in light 
of California’s history of limiting liability of lawyers). 
 255. Compare Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (stating that the California 
Supreme Court in Doctors’ reaffirmed the rule that “a cause of action for 
conspiracy may not arise when the ‘[lawyer], though a participant in the 
agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by 
the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did 
have a duty.’”) with Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 
(Minn. 1999) (stating that “we are not convinced that public policy requires a 
wholesale exclusion of professionals from aiding and abetting” and that “[t]o 
grant professionals such immunity would conceivably give them free reign to 
provide any assistance short of fraud in helping clients engage in conduct the 
professionals know to be tortious.”). 
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1714.10 addresses the claims that third parties may bring against 
lawyers for conspiring with their clients in committing a tortious 
act.256  Section 1714.10 is deemed the “gate-keeping statute,” as it 
filters claims against lawyers from being included in the 
complaint.257  Before filing a complaint against a lawyer for 
conspiring with a client, the plaintiff must commence a special 
proceeding by filing a verified petition alleging liability along with 
supporting affidavits that contain the facts upon which the 
plaintiff’s claim is based.258  The lawyer against whom the claim is 
alleged can combat the plaintiff’s allegation by submitting 
opposing affidavits.259  If the court finds that the petition and the 
affidavits show a reasonable probability of the plaintiff succeeding 
in the action, the court will allow the allegation into the 
complaint.260 
California’s gatekeeping approach may be applied to the 
aiding and abetting oppression context.261  Requiring the aggrieved 
owners to submit to a pre-filing process commands the need for 
strong facts that support the allegations.  The petition aids the 
court in determining whether there is a “reasonable probability 
that the party will prevail in the action” or whether the claim is 
unmeritorious.262  But these claims would most likely be disposed of 
on summary judgment.  As such, a gatekeeping statute may prevent 
the lawyer from becoming deeply intertwined in the owners’ 
litigation, a desirable effect in its own right.  But a pre-pleading 
requirement would do nothing to help the fact-finder determine 
whether a squeeze-out constituted a legitimate business purpose or 
 256. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10 (West 2007). 
 257. See Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 329 
(Dist. Ct. App.  2005) (stating that section 1714.10 is a gatekeeping statute). 
 258. See § 1714.10(a). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  See also Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
325, 334 (“As originally enacted, the [§ 1714.10] prohibited a complaint from 
including a cause of action against an attorney based on a civil conspiracy with his 
or her client, except upon a court finding that the plaintiff had demonstrated a 
reasonable probability of prevailing.”). 
 261. See Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 340 n.10 (stating that “[e]ven 
though aiding and abetting . . . does not generally require that the defendant owe 
an independent duty, we believe that as pleaded against an attorney for conduct 
arising from the representation of a client, and depending on the particular 
allegations, this tort would still fall within the ambit of section 1710.10 and would 
thus be subject to is requirements and exceptions.”). 
 262. See § 1714.10(a). 
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oppression, and if so, whether the lawyer had actual knowledge of 
the oppression. 
Interestingly, an unintentional effect of California case law on 
section 1714.10 highlights California’s reluctance to recognize 
lawyer liability for aiding and abetting client breaches of fiduciary 
duty.  When section 1714.10 is read in light of California case law, it 
is rendered null.263  California courts only impose liability onto 
lawyers where the lawyer directly owes a duty to the plaintiff or 
where the lawyer is acting in her own self-interest.264  Section 
1714.10 excludes from its scope conspiracy claims against lawyers 
where the plaintiff alleges that “(1) the [lawyer] has an 
independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the [lawyer’s] acts go 
beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client 
and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the 
[lawyer’s] financial gain.”265  Essentially, there are no viable 
conspiracy actions to which the gatekeeping statute applies because 
the actions that are removed from the ambit of section 1714.10 are 
the only actions in which courts recognize lawyer liability.266 
3. Minnesota’s Approach: Pleading with Particularity 
In Minnesota, courts use an elevated pleading standard when 
reviewing claims against lawyers and other professionals for aiding 
and abetting.  The elevated pleading standard arose in Witzman v. 
Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, an aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty case brought against an accountant.267  The court in 
Witzman equated accountants with other professionals, such as 
lawyers, for the purpose of imposing aiding and abetting liability.268  
In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim, the court stated, 
If professionals have reason to believe that they may be 
held liable for their clients’ torts merely by providing 
routine professional services to their clients, the 
 263. See Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 134–35 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(reviewing owner’s claim against co-owner and co-owner’s lawyer for conspiracy 
and holding that there is no viable conspiracy claim to which section 1714.10 
applies). 
 264. See id. at 135. 
 265. § 1714.10(c). 
 266. See Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134–35. 
 267. 601 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Minn. 1999) (evaluating issue of first impression 
for professional’s liability under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 876 (1979) for 
aiding and abetting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty). 
 268. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 186. 
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professionals may face a conflict between serving their 
clients and protecting their own interests.  Thus, applying 
aiding and abetting liability to professionals has the 
potential to undermine the trust essential to any 
professional-client relationship.269 
In reconciling the court’s reluctance to expose lawyers to 
plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claims, the court stated that in aiding 
and abetting claims against professionals, the court will “narrowly 
and strictly interpret the elements of the claims and require the 
plaintiff to plead with particularity facts establishing each of these 
elements.”270  Interestingly, after the court heightened the pleading 
requirement for allegations against professionals for aiding and 
abetting, it strayed from the prevailing actual knowledge standard 
and stated that the requisite degree of knowledge necessary to 
impose liability on a professional for aiding and abetting a breach 
of fiduciary duty depends on the circumstances of each case.271 
In its decision, the Witzman court expressed the policy 
concerns that were expressed in the California and Oregon cases.  
Having a similar effect to a gatekeeping statute, pleading with 
particularity weeds out meritless claims that are not based on facts, 
but it also stops some meritorious claims from reaching the purview 
of the court.  The problem with the pleading standard is that it fails 
to address what facts will give rise to a finding of actual knowledge.  
As discussed above, squeeze-out cases often involve technical and 
strategic complexity.  As with the court’s determination of 
oppression, when analyzed in hindsight, aiding and abetting 
oppression may be found by deconstructing the scheme that gave 
rise to the minority owner’s complaint.  A complaint with well-
pleaded facts may not give the reviewing court sufficient insight 
into the lawyer’s involvement in the scheme. 
B. Creating a Rule 
The approaches described above work well in jurisdictions that 
have decided as a matter of policy to subordinate the fiduciary 
relationships between co-owners to the relationships between 
lawyers and their clients.  Restricting the liability of lawyers for their 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 187. 
 271. Id. at 188 (stating that a professional’s long-term or in-depth relationship 
with defendant may suffice to lower the standard of knowledge to constructive 
knowledge). 
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clients’ breaches makes sense in the context of closely-held 
businesses because of the problems in distinguishing oppression 
from legitimate business purposes; however, eliminating the 
minority owner’s ability to pursue an action against the majority 
owner’s lawyer for aiding and abetting a squeeze-out eliminates the 
liability disincentive of lawyers in orchestrating squeeze-outs.  
Therefore, a rule is needed to impose liability on lawyers who 
knowingly assists their clients’ squeeze-outs and to prevent 
innocent lawyers from being drawn into litigation by minority 
owners’ allegations of oppression. 
A rule neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive hinges on the 
knowledge element of aiding and abetting.  A minority owner suing 
a lawyer for aiding and abetting oppression must establish that the 
lawyer had knowledge of the majority owner’s oppression.  The 
lawyer’s knowledge of oppression necessitates the lawyer’s 
knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations.  As 
shown above, reasonable minds may differ as to what a minority 
owner’s reasonable expectations are and to what extent the 
majority owner treaded upon those reasonable expectations in 
pursuing a business decision.  The ideal rule resolves the 
ambiguities of a minority owner’s reasonable expectations before 
an innocent lawyer becomes entrapped in litigation. 
Three main issues arise in establishing a lawyer’s knowledge 
for the purpose of aiding and abetting liability.  The first issue is 
the requisite standard of knowledge that lawyers facing liability 
must possess.272  The second issue is the type of circumstantial 
evidence a plaintiff must bring forth to show that a lawyer had 
actual knowledge.273  The third issue is whether there should be any 
procedural barriers to a plaintiff alleging aiding and abetting 
oppression.274 
1. Standard of Knowledge 
Standards of knowledge lie on a continuum.  On one end is 
constructive knowledge, the “knew or should have known” 
 272. See id. at 188(discussing the use of constructive knowledge and actual 
knowledge in the context of professional liability for aiding and abetting). 
 273. See, e.g., Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791–92 (Or. 1999) (stating 
that a well-pleaded claim of a lawyer’s assistance was sufficient to reverse lower 
court’s dismissal of claim against lawyer). 
 274. See, e.g., Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 325, 
339–40 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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standard, and at the other end is actual knowledge.  In aiding and 
abetting liability, the standard of knowledge required often reflects 
the policy objectives that are being pursued.  For example, in 
Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors,275 the Second Circuit stated 
that constructive knowledge sufficed to hold the defendant liable 
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty in the context of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).276  
The court stated that a trustee of a pension fund’s cursory 
investigation would have uncovered that the general contractor was 
not making required contributions to the pension fund, in 
violation of fiduciary duty.277  In using this lower standard of 
knowledge, which essentially imposed the duty to investigate upon 
the trustee, the court was upholding policies with regard to the 
thoroughness and application of ERISA.278 
Though it may have its place in protecting pension plans 
overseen by the federal government, constructive knowledge 
should not carry over to squeeze-outs.  When the standard of 
knowledge is “should-have-known,” lawyers would be required to 
investigate suspicious activity.  Imposing a duty to investigate 
implies that the lawyer owes some heightened duty to the minority 
owner.  The duty to investigate would unduly hamper the effective 
representation of lawyers because it would upset the trust and 
confidence between the lawyer and her client.  Moreover, it is not 
the lawyer’s role to question the policy decisions of her clients,279 
and with the “should-have-known standard,” the lawyer will be 
inclined to make these inquiries out of fear for personal liability. 
In the context of lawyer liability, some courts use the 
constructive knowledge standard loosely without considering the 
impact that the standard of knowledge would have on lawyers.  For 
example, in Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glover,280  the court reviewed 
 275. 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 276. Id. at 283. 
 277. Id. (“Although the extent of the duty of inquiry may not be the same in all 
circumstances, there is no doubt that here even a cursory investigation would have 
uncovered [primary actor’s] breach.”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 3. (1983).  Rule 1.13 
addresses the lawyer’s role when representing a corporation; however, the 
limitation of the lawyer’s representation relating to “[d]ecisions concerning policy 
and operations, including ones entailing serious risk” that are not in the lawyer’s 
province should be emphasized.  Id.  Second-guessing the client is different than 
advising the client. 
 280. 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002). 
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an appeal of summary judgment that involved alleged lawyer 
misconduct in a closely-held business.281  In Chem-Age, the founding 
co-owner’s lawyer assisted him in making a number of 
misrepresentations to the other co-owners regarding their interest 
in the business.282  These misrepresentations led to the co-owners 
pursuing the lawyer in a suit involving a number of different claims, 
including breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, fraud, conversion, 
and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.283  In denying the 
plaintiffs recovery on their breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice 
actions, the court was steadfast in the importance of maintaining 
the lawyer-client relationship.284 
The court then turned to the Restatement to determine 
whether the lawyer could be held liable for the co-owner’s 
actions.285  In its analysis, the court cautioned that “[h]olding 
attorneys liable for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary 
duty in rendering professional services poses both a hazard and a 
quandary for the legal profession . . . . [O]verbroad liability might 
diminish the quality of legal services, since it would impose ‘self 
protective reservations’ in the attorney-client relationship.”286  
Interestingly, despite the court’s emphasis on preventing overly 
broad liability, the court stated constructive knowledge would 
suffice in some cases to impose liability on a lawyer for aiding and 
 281. Id. at 769 (noting the increase “in case law and professional literature on 
attorney liability to third parties.”).  In Chem-Age, the founding co-owner (Dahl) 
induced two businessmen, Shepard and Peterson, to invest in Chem-Age by 
misrepresenting to them that in return for their investment, they would be equity 
owners of Chem-Age.  Id. at 761–63.  Dahl’s attorney, Glover, who had represented 
Dahl in previous engagements acted as the corporation’s attorney.  Id.  Glover 
prepared the paperwork listing Shepard and Peterson as incorporators and Glover 
as registered agent.  Id.  Over time, Dahl began to use Chem-Age’s credit for 
personal expenses, including personal gifts to Glover.  Id.  After calling a meeting 
to address Dahl’s suspicious spending habits, Shepard and Peterson learned that 
Dahl and Glover were in the process of selling Chem-Age’s assets.  Id.  In addition, 
despite the papers that Glover seemingly filed with the Secretary of State, the two 
businessmen learned that they had no ownership interest in Chem-Age.  Id. 
 282. Id. at 761–62. 
 283. Id. at 761. 
 284. See id. at 769–71 (listing several reasons why the court is reluctant to relax 
rule of privity in cases involving third party malpractice claims against lawyers). 
 285. “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to 
the other so to conduct himself . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 876(b) 
(1979). 
 286. Chem-Age, 652 N.W.2d at 774. 
52
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/1
6. EID - ADC 4/23/2008  7:40:03 PM 
2008] LAWYER LIABILITY 1229 
 
abetting, but that the use of constructive knowledge should be 
limited to contexts in which the lawyer-client relationship was of 
long duration.287 
The court’s suggestion that constructive knowledge is an 
available standard contradicts the court’s policy that lawyer liability 
should be limited.  Leaving the door open to constructive 
knowledge as a standard for lawyer liability for aiding and abetting 
in closely-held businesses leaves lawyers open to liability.  The use 
of constructive knowledge as the standard for aiding and abetting 
falls short of providing adequate safeguards against lawyers.  It is 
inappropriate in light of the policies against aiding and abetting 
having an over-inclusive effect.288 
To provide primary actors more protection than the 
constructive knowledge standard allows, some courts have turned 
to recklessness as a standard of knowledge.289  A court using 
recklessness as the standard of knowledge will find knowledge 
where the conduct indicates a reckless disregard of the 
consequences of an action or where there is highly unreasonable 
conduct involving an extreme departure from ordinary care in a 
situation where a high degree of danger present.290  Courts rarely 
spend a significant time evaluating which standard of knowledge to 
use in reviewing a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting; 
however, the court in Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness291 stated 
that in some contexts, specifically securities, where transactions are 
highly regulated, the underlying violations that give rise to aiding 
and abetting liability are clearer cut and a lower standard of 
knowledge suffices.292  In contrast to securities cases, the inter se 
 287. Id. at 775. 
 288. Compare Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, 974 F.2d 270, 283 (2nd. 
Cir. 1992) (analyzing aiding and abetting in the trust context) with Chem-Age 
Industries v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774 (S.D. 2002) (delineating the policies 
against over-inclusive liability to lawyers). 
 289. See Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459–60 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 290. See, e.g., Bolmer v. McKulsky, 812 A.2d 869, 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).  
To establish the defendant’s recklessness, the plaintiff has to prove that 
on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness 
with reference to the consequences of one's acts. . . . [Such conduct] is 
more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . [I]n order to 
infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a 
reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take 
reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . . 
Id. 
 291. 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 292. Id. at 1027 n.37. 
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obligations of co-owners in closely-held businesses are not highly 
regulated. 
When the violation is evident, such as a “plain vanilla” breach 
of fiduciary duty, it may be appropriate to impose liability under a 
lesser standard of knowledge.293  But in the closely-held business 
context where oppression is not evident, a recklessness standard of 
knowledge does not resolve the problem of determining whether a 
lawyer had knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable 
expectations.  Oppression involves an underlying breach that is 
contingent upon a reviewing court’s analysis of the fiduciary 
relationship, so a higher level of knowledge is necessary to prevent 
a lawyer from being vulnerable to minority owner attacks. 
In criminal law, the doctrine of conscious avoidance has been 
used as an alternative standard to actual knowledge.294  A higher 
standard than recklessness, the doctrine provides that although the 
defendant may not have possessed actual knowledge, the 
defendant’s lack of knowledge was due to affirmative acts on her 
part to avoid discovery of the alleged wrongdoing.295  In criminal 
conspiracy cases, conscious avoidance may be used to prove that 
the defendant had knowledge of the “unlawful aims and objectives 
of the scheme” if “the evidence is such that a rational juror may 
reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that [the 
defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] 
and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”296 
 293. Id.  In securities cases, the concern is “typically with the relative degree of 
involvement of peripheral parties (i.e., brokers, banks, accountants) to the fraud, 
not the ambiguous nature of the fraud itself.”  Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459–
60 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that in securities cases “[r]ecklessness satisfies the 
knowledge requirement where the defendant owes a duty of disclosure to the 
plaintiff” and that “[p]roof of a defendant’s knowledge or intent will often be 
inferential and cases thus of necessity cast in terms of recklessness.”). 
 294. See United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A jury] 
instruction on conscious avoidance is proper only ‘(i) when a defendant asserts 
the lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction and (ii) the 
appropriate factual predicate for the charge exists.”) (quoting United States v. 
Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 181 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 295. Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Conscious Avoidance: A Substitute for 
Actual Knowledge?, N.Y. L. J., May 1, 2007, at 3. 
 296. United States. v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
conscious avoidance instruction was harmless error because jury was also 
instructed on actual knowledge and evidence supported a finding of defendant’s 
actual knowledge of conspiracy to commit fraud). 
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Although distinguishing between conscious avoidance and 
actual knowledge may be necessary in criminal law, where a 
defendant is at risk of incarceration and other harsh penalties, this 
distinction would not play as pivotal a role if applied to civil aiding 
and abetting.297  The burden of proof to impose civil aiding and 
abetting liability is lower than the burden of proof needed to 
impose criminal liability.298  To impose criminal liability, the 
evidence must be such that jurors are certain beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime.299  But in the 
context of civil aiding and abetting, only the greater weight of the 
evidence is required for the trier of fact to decide that the 
defendant is liable.300  In the context of aiding and abetting 
squeeze-outs, evidence that shows that a lawyer was aware of a high 
probability that her client’s motive was to oppress the minority 
owner, but continued to assist the client anyway, may be sufficiently 
convincing to establish actual knowledge by a preponderance of 
the evidence.301  Actual knowledge is the correct standard to apply 
in lawyer aiding and abetting cases because requiring the minority 
owner to prove actual knowledge does not foreclose the minority 
owner’s opportunity to bring forth meritorious claims and because 
the lawyer-client relationship should be protected. 
2. Proving Actual Knowledge 
At first glance, meeting the burden of proving actual 
knowledge appears impossible.  Ideally, actual knowledge is 
established by direct evidence, where the lawyer makes an 
admission of wrongdoing or where the lawyer drafts documents 
that include blatant misrepresentations.302  It is rare that the lawyer 
 297. See id. (stating that evidence that supports finding that defendant had 
actual knowledge does necessarily support finding that defendant willfully avoided 
a fact). 
 298. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (stating that 
burden of proof in civil matters is typically preponderance-of-the-evidence). 
 299. See, e.g., Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 154. 
 300. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. 
 301. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  A high probability of client 
misconduct should be distinguished from mere “red flags,” as lawyers should not 
be required to investigate their client’s motives.  Id. 
 302. For example, when a lawyer drafts and sends letters to a plaintiff 
containing false information regarding the legal effectiveness of the majority 
owner’s previous attempts to remove the plaintiff from the business, direct 
evidence may be found.  Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791 (Or. 1999). 
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mentions to another that she not only knew of her client’s breach 
of fiduciary duty but that she substantially assisted her client in 
furtherance of that breach.303  For actual knowledge not to be a 
complete barrier to aiding and abetting claims, it must be possible 
to prove actual knowledge through circumstantial evidence.304 
The issue then becomes the quantity and quality of 
circumstantial evidence needed to impose liability onto a lawyer.  
Circumstantial evidence must amount to more than creating an 
inference that the lawyer should have known of her client’s 
unlawful conduct or that the lawyer was reckless in providing 
assistance in ousting a minority owner in a business where 
relationships among co-owners are volatile.  In situations where 
there is an absence of misrepresentations or violations of the law, a 
lawyer’s claim that she was acting in furtherance of a client’s 
legitimate business purpose should be given great weight.305 
a. Assessing knowledge and substantial assistance in tandem 
Establishing that the lawyer had actual knowledge requires a 
 303. See, e.g., id. at 791–92 (analyzing lawyer’s assistance to determine whether 
plaintiff stated a valid claim against lawyers); Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 
799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (reviewing lawyer’s actions to 
determine whether to dismiss complaint). 
 304. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 49, at 43.  In analyzing the requirement 
of actual knowledge, plaintiffs may prove the defendant had knowledge by 
circumstantial evidence, usually through a series of “red flags” that leads one to 
ask how the defendant could not have seen them along the way; however, “[t]here 
is a danger in such a must-have-known analysis . . . the secondary actor's alleged 
awareness of the fraud is subjected to the scalpel of the legal dissector, not from 
the vantage of foresight, but from the perspective of omniscient hindsight.”  Id. at 
43–44. 
 305. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The 
“McDonnell Douglas” test is used in employment discrimination cases to 
determine whether an employee has been wrongfully discriminated against.  
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case of employment discrimination.  Id. at 802.  The defendant employer 
must then present a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision.  Id.  If 
the defendant offers such a reason, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the 
defendant employer’s “legitimate” reasons were not the result of improper 
pretext.  Id. at 804.  Shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate 
business purpose was pretextual has received criticism as it is incredibly difficult to 
do.  See Joe Keith Windle, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Is the Supreme Court’s 
Definition of Pretext Beneficial or Detrimental to Title VII Plaintiffs?, 18 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 213, 226–27 (1994) (delineating the difficulties plaintiffs face in prevailing 
in employment discrimination actions).  The burden-shifting results in the court 
giving deference to the legitimate business decisions of employers.  See id. 
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factual inquiry in addition to the initial factual inquiry that resulted 
in a finding of oppression.  The quality and quantity of 
circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to give rise to a finding of 
actual knowledge must be such that the fact-finder can be sure that 
the lawyer knew about the client’s breach.306  Because both 
oppression and the lawyer-client relationship are so fact specific, a 
court’s analysis of a lawyer’s actual knowledge of oppression in one 
case will not be applicable to another case.  As previously discussed, 
comment (d) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) 
allows the decision maker to use various factors in evaluating 
whether the lawyer substantially assisted her client in breaching a 
fiduciary duty.307  These same factors provide guidance in finding 
relevant evidence to show that the lawyer had actual knowledge. 
Analyzing knowledge and substantial assistance in tandem is 
not a novel approach; however, it has received some criticism.308  
The concern arises when courts require less assistance with the 
 306. In determining a lawyer’s liability for aiding and abetting, the plaintiff 
must show by the preponderance of the evidence that the lawyer had actual 
knowledge.  See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Slocum, Gordon & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 187 
(D.R.I. 2004) (stating that plaintiffs fail to establish security regulations violations, 
including aiding and abetting violations, by a preponderance of the evidence).  
Therefore, the weight of the evidence must be supportive of the fact-finder’s 
conclusion.  See, e.g., Northrup v. State, No. 14-06-00967-CR, 2007 WL 4442611, at 
*1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2007).  The court in Northrup discussed factual 
sufficiency: 
In reviewing factual sufficiency, we view all the evidence in a neutral light 
to determine whether (1) the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, 
although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury's verdict 
seems clearly wrong and unjust; and (2) in considering conflicting 
evidence, the jury's verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless 
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence . . . . We 
consider all the evidence and we do not intrude upon the jury's role of 
assigning credibility and weight to the evidence. 
Id. 
 307. The factors include: 1) the nature of the act encouraged; 2) the amount 
of assistance given by the defendant; 3) his presence or absence at the time of the 
tort; 4) his relation to the fiduciary; 5) the defendant’s state of mind.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).  A sixth factor, the 
duration of assistance, originated in case law and is also included in this analysis.  
Halberstram v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The length of time an 
alleged aider-abettor has been involved with a tortfeasor almost certainly affects 
the quality and extent of their relationship and probably influences the amount of 
aid provided as well; additionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant's state of 
mind.”). 
 308. See Combs, supra note 14, at 274 (arguing that requiring less assistance 
broadens the scope of liability to the aider and abettor). 
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showing of more knowledge.309  Such concern is justifiable, as it is 
unclear why a greater showing of knowledge would lessen the 
amount of assistance needed for liability to attach.  Just as more 
knowledge could substitute for less participation, the type and 
degree of participation may be evidence of knowledge.310  In the 
aiding and abetting oppression context where the breach of 
fiduciary duty is not obvious, a showing that by the very nature and 
amount of the assistance the lawyer had to have known of the 
underlying breach may be the only way to establish knowledge. 
The lawyer’s conduct could reflect knowledge in many 
situations.  The length of the lawyer/client relationship or the 
duration of assistance could be indicative of actual knowledge.311  
Oppression cases involve an entanglement of the minority owner’s 
reasonable expectations and the majority owner’s legitimate 
business interests.312  A long-time lawyer for the majority owner 
would have a difficult time asserting that she did not know of the 
minority owner’s reasonable expectations; however, if a lawyer has 
represented a majority owner for a few months, the lawyer’s client’s 
attempt to oppress the minority owner may not be evident.  In 
relationships of short duration, a lawyer may not fully understand 
the extent of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations.  The 
lawyer’s lack of exposure to the business diminishes her ability to 
distinguish between a legitimate business and oppression, 
especially if the client offers a legitimate (though false) business 
purpose, such as the minority owner having a nervous breakdown, 
to support his request.313 
A long-term relationship between a lawyer and a majority 
owner is indicative of the lawyer being closely involved in the 
business; but duration alone does not conclusively show intimacy of 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lerman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 
1999) (“Factors such as the relationship between the defendant and the primary 
tortfeasor, the nature of the primary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the 
assistance provided by the defendant, and the defendant’s state of mind all come 
into play.”). 
 311. See id. 
 312. See, e.g., Pooley v. Mankator Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994); Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 313. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d at 801–2 (finding that majority owner’s conduct 
including firing the minority owner, discontinuing the minority owner’s benefits, 
and telling fellow employees that minority owner had a nervous breakdown, was a 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
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involvement.314  The key question is whether the lawyer had 
sufficient interaction with her client and the business in order to 
detect oppression.315  A lawyer who is deeply involved with the 
affairs of the owners and knows that each owner has a desire to stay 
in the business, most likely is aware of the owners’ reasonable 
expectations.316  If it shown that the lawyer had extensive 
interaction with the owners and the company and the majority 
owner’s purported legitimate business purpose involves a 
misrepresentation.  A lawyer’s excuse of not knowing will lack 
merit.317  Hence, the lawyer’s conduct must be viewed in light of her 
knowledge of the minority owner’s reasonable expectations so that 
the lawyer who orchestrates a squeeze-out will not be able to 
benefit from a blurred boundary between minority owner’s 
reasonable expectations and the majority owner’s legitimate 
business purposes. 
The factor that is perhaps the most significant in a lawyer 
aiding and abetting oppression analysis is the nature of the act.318  
As discussed above, lawyers are often necessary in oppression 
because of the technical and strategic complexity involved in 
squeeze-outs.319  For example, in Granewich v. Harding,320  the 
lawyer’s use of overtly aggressive and complex techniques shows 
how the lawyer’s assistance was necessary to the majority owner’s 
objective of removing the minority owner from the business.321  The 
level of sophistication of the assistance is sufficient to show that the 
 314. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that 
the secondary actor’s relation to the primary tortfeasor is only one factor to 
consider); see also Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188 (stating that duration of assistance is 
one factor that could lead to a court’s use of constructive knowledge as requisite 
standard of knowledge). 
 315. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (stating that the amount of assistance 
although not overwhelming “added up over time to an essential part of the 
pattern”). 
 316. See supra Part III.B.3.c. 
 317. The scenario described in the text is based on Pedro v. Pedro, 489 
N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), which held that majority owner’s actions in 
ousting the minority owner, including misrepresenting that the minority owner 
was incompetent, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. at 802. 
 318. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484 (“[T]he nature of the act dictates what 
aid might matter.”). 
 319. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577 (noting that lawyer liability in the 
squeeze-out context “stems from the necessity of attorney involvement in that type 
of transaction”). 
 320. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999). 
 321. Id. at 791.  The majority owners sought the assistance of the lawyer after 
they had attempted to remove the minority owner themselves.  Id. 
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lawyer had to have known that the client was squeezing out the 
minority owner.322 
Even if a lawyer has actual knowledge of her client’s breach of 
fiduciary duty, a lawyer will not be liable for aiding and abetting her 
client unless the lawyer provided substantial assistance to her client 
in furtherance of that breach.  In the context of professionals, 
courts are careful not to impose liability on those who conduct 
“routine professional services.”323  Among the policies that inspire 
courts to protect professionals from liability for performing routine 
services is maintaining the trust in the professional-client 
relationship.324  Additionally, a wide “liability net” might stifle the 
willingness of lawyers to represent majority owners in pursuing 
legitimate business purposes.  But when a lawyer is essential to 
effectuating a complex squeeze-out, she is more than a scrivener.  
The technical and strategic assistance that a lawyer provides 
requires more than merely filling out forms for the client.  It 
requires expertise.  Therefore, in the oppression context, a 
squeeze-out that could only occur with the assistance of a lawyer 
provides the best evidence for establishing not only actual 
knowledge but substantial assistance.325 
 322. For an example of the need for lawyers in oppression cases, see 
Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that lawyer was not liable conspiring with client/majority owner in 
breaching fiduciary duties owed to minority owner because lawyer did not owe 
minority owner any fiduciary duties).  In Skarbevik, the lawyer knew that the 
majority of owners intended to dilute the minority owner’s interest in the business.  
Id. at 631–32.  The lawyer informed his clients that they needed a “legitimate 
corporate purpose” before any amendment to the by-laws, which would be 
detrimental to the minority. owner, could be made.  Id. at 631.  The lawyer 
proceeded to draft documents containing misrepresentations in order to oppress 
the minority owner.  Id. at 632. 
 323. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Minn. 
1999) (“‘[S]ubstantial assistance’ means something more than providing routine 
professional services.”).  Although Witzman involves an aiding and abetting claim 
against an accountant, it is analogous to contexts in which professionals are 
providing routine services. 
 324. Id. at 186 (“If professionals have reason to believe that they may be held 
liable for their clients' torts merely by providing routine professional services to 
their clients, the professionals may face a conflict between serving their clients and 
protecting their own interests.”). 
 325. See Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the 
facts in the plaintiff/co-owner’s complaint against lawyer, including the lawyer 
drafting an unfair buyout agreement and release, formatting it in such a way as to 
look like another document, and then giving it to the client/owner in the middle 
of the night knowing that the client is going to the co-owner’s home to trick the 
co-owner into handing over his interest in the business, were sufficient to allege 
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3. Procedural Barriers 
For the court to find actual knowledge, it must determine 
whether a squeeze-out is the result of a technically and strategically 
savvy scheme that is so connected with obvious misconduct so as to 
imply the lawyer’s knowledge.326  A layperson does not have the 
knowledge and experience to be able to determine the point at 
which evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes the lawyer’s 
actual knowledge of her client’s oppression.327  Just as a co-owner 
needs the assistance of a lawyer to effect a squeeze-out, a fact-
finder’s ability to determine the lawyer’s actual knowledge requires 
an expert.328  Existing procedures for determining legal malpractice 
liability provide a way to supplement the fact-finder’s ability in 
reviewing the evidence. 
In Minnesota, to bring a claim against a lawyer for malpractice, 
the plaintiff must comply with Minnesota Statutes section 544.42.329  
Section 544.42, subdivision 2 requires a plaintiff who plans on 
using expert testimony to establish a prima facie case and to submit 
with the pleadings an affidavit that states that the allegations have 
been reviewed by the plaintiff’s lawyer with the assistance an 
expert.330  The initial affidavit must include the lawyer’s statement 
that an expert “whose qualifications provide reasonable 
expectation that the expert’s opinions could be admissible at trial 
and that, in the opinion of the expert, the defendant deviated from 
the applicable standard of care.”331  In addition to this initial 
affidavit, within 180 days of commencing the action, the plaintiff 
must provide the defendant with an expert disclosure that: 
substantial assistance and knowledge in an aiding and abetting claim against the 
lawyer). 
 326. See supra Part III.B.3.b. 
 327. See Barksdale, supra note 38, at 577 (“Attorneys routinely facilitate 
corporate squeeze-outs because the close corporation is a legal entity whose very 
existence derives from attorney input and whose rules of governance and 
procedures are not easily understood by lay persons.”). 
 328. See supra Part III.B.3.c. 
 329. See Charles E. Lundberg, Legal Malpractice: Techniques to Avoid Liability 
1999, 608 PLI/LIT 357, 361 (1999) (stating that “[i]n all but the most obvious 
situations, a legal malpractice plaintiff must establish the applicable standard of 
care, and the defendant’s breach of that standard, through a competent witness—
an attorney who has practical experience in the subject matter” and that section 
544.42 now requires the same type of expert review for legal malpractice actions as 
is required in medical malpractice actions). 
 330. Id. 
 331. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 2 (2006). 
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(1) identifies each person the attorney expects to call as 
an expert; (2) describes the expert’s opinion on the 
applicable standard of care, as recognized by the 
professional community; (3) explains the expert’s opinion 
that the defendant departed from that standard; and (4) 
summarizes the expert’s opinion that the defendant’s 
departure was a direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.332 
The minimum standard in fulfilling the affidavit requirement is to 
provide the parties and the court with meaningful information with 
respect to the issues on which the expert will be testifying so as to 
avoid a directed verdict.333 
Section 544.42 was enacted ostensibly for the purpose of 
limiting frivolous claims against professionals.334  In malpractice 
claims, the expert’s testimony has the dual effect of filtering out 
frivolous claims against the lawyer and of adding legitimacy to the 
plaintiff’s claim.  The requirement of a lawyer’s testimony weeds 
out unmeritorious claims by ensuring that the lawyer’s conduct is 
measured against an objective standard of reasonableness in the 
legal profession.335  Furthermore, expert review limits frivolous 
claims by forcing lawyers who testify on the issue of another 
lawyer’s conduct to “put her name on the line.”  The risk of 
disparaging one’s professional reputation discourages a lawyer 
from being an expert for a plaintiff pursuing a bogus claim. 
The objectives behind requiring expert testimony in legal 
malpractice actions are equally present in aiding and abetting 
fiduciary duty actions against lawyers.  Lawyers who assist majority 
owners in pursuing legitimate business purposes risk being sued by 
minority owners claiming oppression.336  Accordingly, a law 
requiring an expert affidavit and testimony in aiding and abetting 
actions against lawyers is appropriate.  Unlike in a legal malpractice 
 332. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Minn. 
2007) (analyzing section 544.42’s command for sufficient information in expert 
affidavits in accountant malpractice claim). 
 333. See id. (holding that the expert’s affidavit, which included a detailed 
description of the factual application drawing certain legal conclusions, was 
deficient because the affidavit did not identify any standard of care, state how the 
professional deviated from the applicable standard of care, and show how the 
deviation caused plaintiff’s injury). 
 334. Id. at 217. 
 335. See Noske v. Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d 866, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(stating that malpractice does not apply to a “claim based on a lawyer’s failure to 
pursue a particular strategy.”). 
 336. See supra Part I. 
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action, however, where the issue is whether the lawyer was 
negligent, the issue in an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty action is whether the lawyer had actual knowledge of her 
client’s oppressive scheme and whether she substantially assisted 
her client.337  Therefore, in an aiding and abetting action, the focus 
of the expert’s testimony would be something different than the 
applicable standard of care. 
In determining the substance of the expert’s testimony, one 
must be wary of evidence that would be unduly prejudicial to the 
lawyer and would consequently be inadmissible.338  In general, 
expert witnesses are barred from making conclusory statements 
about a defendant’s knowledge or intent.339  Instead of the 
defendant/lawyer’s actual knowledge being the focus of the 
expert’s affidavit, the testimony must concentrate on the actual 
squeeze-out. 
As discussed above, in the aiding and abetting squeeze-out 
context, the crux of the actual knowledge and substantial assistance 
inquiries is the existence of a strategically or technically complex 
squeeze-out.  The expert must use the facts including the business’s 
charter and bylaws (which may allude to the minority owner’s 
reasonable expectations), the documents, the transactions, the 
availability of alternative decisions that would have protected the 
minority owner’s reasonable expectations, and any other relevant 
information to analyze the squeeze-out objectively.  After 
 337. See Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). 
A cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty 
requires (1) breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to a plaintiff, (2) a 
defendant’s knowing participation in the breach, and (3) damages.  A 
claim for legal malpractice requires proof of damages incurred by the 
plaintiff client and caused by the negligence of an attorney who owes a 
duty of care to the client. 
Id. 
 338. FED. R. EVID. 403, 704. 
 339. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating that expert testimony of defendant’s mental history was admissible to 
prove defendant’s state of mind, but that expert may not make conclusions about 
a defendant’s “actual beliefs at time of offense, about the reasonableness of those 
beliefs, or about [defendant's] state of mind before, during and after the criminal 
act”).  Additionally, certain actions against lawyers involving intentional conduct 
such as intentional misrepresentation , breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud do not 
require expert witnesses.  See Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 589 S.E.2d 
840, 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that statute requiring expert affidavit applies 
only to claims alleging professional negligence, not claims based on intentional 
conduct). 
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examining the mechanisms and level of complexity existent in the 
squeeze-out, the expert may opine as to whether the squeeze-out 
was so complex that only a lawyer could have orchestrated it. 
This approach is not novel as it has been used in criminal law 
for establishing a person’s connection with a gang.340  For example, 
in People v. Garcia, the court distinguished an expert’s testimony 
regarding the “culture, habits, and psychology of gangs” from 
testimony of a defendant’s specific intent or knowledge because the 
former are merely probative and are subjects “sufficiently beyond 
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the 
trier of fact.”341  In Garcia, the defendant’s particularized knowledge 
of the gang’s activities evidenced his affiliation.  Similarly, the 
expert’s affidavit characterizes the squeeze-out as an act that only a 
select few have the skill to do. 
A rule that requires an expert affidavit in aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty actions against lawyers equips courts with 
the expertise necessary to decide complex cases.  The rule is not 
under-inclusive; it protects and encourages the trust and honesty 
existent in fiduciary relationships among co-owners.  If a majority 
owner establishes a prima facie case of aiding and abetting breach 
of fiduciary duty with an affidavit combined with a well-pleaded 
complaint, litigation continues.342  The rule imposes on lawyers the 
liability-related disincentive to give necessary assistance in squeeze-
outs and prevents lawyers from being necessary handmaidens to 
their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duties.  The rule is not over-
inclusive; it safeguards the lawyer-client relationship and prevents 
frivolous minority claims against lawyers.  The affidavit is a 
sufficient barrier to unmeritorious claims.  As lawyers have no more 
 340. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 2007). 
We publish this case because we hold that evidence of actual knowledge 
of a criminal street gang’s current activities, including information about 
where gang members had hidden gang guns and the identity of members 
who were engaged in gang shootings, when an expert testifies such 
information is available only to other active gang members, satisfies the 
statutory requirement of active participation in a gang. 
Id. 
 341. Id. at 114. 
 342. Other probative factors that may be used to establish actual knowledge 
such as the duration of the lawyer’s assistance would most likely stay in the 
plaintiff’s actual complaint. The duration of assistance and the particular 
relationship that the lawyer had with the business and the co-owners lead to a 
subjective inquiry into the lawyer’s actual knowledge and best left out of an 
expert’s affidavit stating “objective” opinion. 
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reason to fear an aiding and abetting claim than they do a 
malpractice claim, the policies associated with imposing liability 
onto lawyers for aiding and abetting squeeze-outs, including the 
chilling effect on representation and the trust existent in the 
lawyer-client relationship, are not in jeopardy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fiduciary duties are important tools to ensure that the 
dominant party does not take advantage of the weaker party in a 
confidential relationship.343  Inter se fiduciary obligations are 
fundamental to maintaining trust and confidence among co-owners 
in closely-held businesses.344  When co-owners enter into a 
relationship, there are certain expectations that each owner has 
that are fundamental to their participation in the business.345  
Safeguarding the duty of loyalty existent among owners in closely-
held businesses is necessary to protect minority owners from being 
oppressed by their stronger counterparts.  A continuation of this 
proposition is that lawyers who aid and abet their clients in 
oppression should be liable for aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty.346 
Reasonable expectations can be ambiguous, so subjecting 
lawyers to liability for aiding and abetting oppression could result 
in lawyers second guessing their clients’ motives and objectives in 
making decisions in closely-held businesses.347  The fiduciary 
relationships among co-owners should not jeopardize the trust and 
confidence between a lawyer and her client.  In addition, lawyers 
could be forced into years of protracted litigation by disgruntled 
minority owners bringing forth frivolous suits.  To protect the 
lawyer-client relationship and to prevent innocent lawyers from 
being drawn into litigation, liability should be restricted to cases in 
which it is clear that the lawyer knowingly assisted her client in 
oppressing a minority owner. 
Preventing aiding and abetting liability from having an over-
inclusive effect requires a strong showing that a lawyer knowingly 
and substantially assisted a majority owner’s breach of fiduciary 
 343. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 344. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 345. See id. 
 346. See supra Part III.B.3.c. 
 347. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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duty.348  Where there is a lack of direct evidence revealing a lawyer’s 
liability in the squeeze-out, a minority owner may present certain 
circumstantial evidence, such as an expert witness, that implicates 
the lawyer’s involvement in the squeeze-out.  A threshold finding 
that a squeeze-out was structured and carried out in such a way that 
a lawyer had to have been involved strikes a necessary balance 
between a lawyer’s interest in providing advice and assistance to her 
client and a minority owner’s reasonable expectations. 
 
 348. See supra Part IV.B. 
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